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Yet, if so keen your zeal to know
In briefthe tale of Troy's last woe,
Though memory shrinks with backward start,
And sends a shudder to my heart,
I take the word.
*.. A giant horse uprear,
And with compacted beams ofpine
The texture of its ribs entwine...
There in the monster's cavernous side
Huge frames of chosen chiefs they hide,
And steel-clad soldieryfinds room
Within that death-producing womb.
-

Virgil 1

INTRODUCTION

N

Ogeneral

constitutional principle is so accepted in theory yet so
often violated in practice than that the Bill of Rights is a bulwark
against majority tyranny. In theory, the Bill of Rights shields particular spheres of human affairs from majoritarian intercession. It follows
that these protected spheres should not be the subject of majoritarian
definition. 2 Contrary to theory, however, the Bill of Rights is not
such an invulnerable fortress.
The threshold question in constitutional adjudication is whether a
constitutional right is implicated. The answer to this question determines whether and to what degree the United States Supreme Court
reviews challenged state action. If the Constitution encompasses the
I The Aeneid of Virgil 38 (John Conington trans., 1900).
Justice Robert H. Jackson made this point eloquently:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right
to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on
the outcome of no elections.
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943); see also Barron v.
Mayor & City Council, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247-51 (1833) (asserting that Bill of Rights protects people from the federal government's power); 1 Annals of Cong. 448-59 (Joseph Gales,
Sr., ed., 1834) (discussing the purpose of the Bill of Rights).
2
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asserted right, the state should have to justify any abridgment of that
right. If no constitutional right is involved, however, sound principles
of democracy counsel deference to the majority will. Constitutional
analysis thus consists of two stages in the abstract: the first is a matter
of defining the Constitution to determine if it applies; the second is a
matter of applying the Constitution to the instant case under whatever
standard of review is dictated by the first part of the analysis.3 Upon
close examination, however, it turns out that in practice these parts
are not highly differentiated. Matters of application regularly intrude
into questions of definition. The search for the meaning of the constitutional text often includes a review of the government interests at
stake. Because the threshold question regarding the existence of constitutional rights has become infected with the government's countervailing interests, those individual rights have lost much of their
vitality, if not their very existence.
As a practical matter, the definition prong determines who must
bear the "burden of proof" or the "burden of persuasion" in the application stage, and how heavy that burden will be.4 It is commonly
believed, moreover, that the standard of review the Court chooses
when defining the Constitution preordains the outcome when applying the Constitution: the party bearing the burden of persuasion usually loses.5 Thus, the Court's failure to separate definition from
application in constitutional interpretation has a profound effect on
constitutional discourse. Under conventional doctrine, when the
Constitution is implicated, the state bears the burden of demonstrat3 Professor Schauer makes this distinction between definition and application in the First
Amendment context by distinguishing between coverage and protection: "It is especially
important... to distinguish between activities that are within the scope of the first amendment
and those that are not, and at the same time to distinguish between coverage and protection."
Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity": An Exercise in the
Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 Geo. L.J. 899, 905 (1979).
4 Throughout this Article I use the term "burden of persuasion" rather than "burden of
proof" to describe the allocation of responsibility for demonstrating issues of constitutional
concern between the parties. See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text for further
discussion of this issue. In addition, I purposely leave this term rather ambiguous because the
Court uses the term loosely in its constitutional theory and in its constitutional practice, and
because an attempt to fully develop the concept in constitutional adjudication would require
an article in itself.
5 As Professor Gunther first observed regarding the standard of strict scrutiny, the standard
is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8
(1972).
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ing the state interests that justify infringing on those constitutional
rights, as well as the empirical link between those ends and its chosen
means. By moving the analysis of government interests into the definition prong, the Court effectively reverses the allocation of the burdens for demonstrating the empirical basis supporting the
government's asserted interests. Now the challenger of the state
action must shoulder the burden of refuting the state's interests to
convince the Court that it should find, as an initial matter, that a
constitutional right is implicated. Whether government interest analysis is treated within constitutional definition or application, therefore, frames and inevitably affects the course of constitutional
adjudication.
Several commentators have noted the Court's practice of shifting
government interest analysis from the application prong into the definition prong in particular areas of the Constitution. 6 This Article
illustrates how the Court employs this strategy throughoutthe Constitution, and it challenges the practice of using government interests at
the rights definition stage as contrary to the fundamental operating
assumptions of the Constitution. The Court's corruption of the
6 In a recent article, Professor Laurence Tribe and Michael Doff criticized Justice Antonin
Scalia for relying on government purposes in the process of defining the liberty right at stake in
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 n.4 (1989). They remarked on the effect of this
view:
When we automatically incorporate the factors that provide the state's possible
justifications for its regulation into the initial definition of a liberty, the fundamental
nature of that liberty nearly vanishes. Unless the state's interest is facially absurd, when
it is suitably incorporated into an asserted liberty it will render that liberty so specific as
to seem insupportable .... At a minimum, the privacy right protected in Roe becomes
the implausible "right" to destroy a living fetus. If one takes footnote 4 to its logical
limit in the interpretation of enumerated rights, then the free speech right protected in
New York Times Co. v Sullivan becomes the dubious "right" to libel a public official,
and the right to an exclusionary remedy protected in Mapp v Ohio becomes the counterintuitive "right" of a criminal to suppress the truth. To state these cases this way is to
decide them in the government's favor.... Under Justice Scalia's footnote 4 approach
... the state interest obliterates, without explanation and at the outset, any trace of the
individual liberty at stake.
Lawrence H. Tribe and Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1057, 1096-97 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
Other commentators who have noted the use of government interest analysis in rights definition include Professor Monaghan, discussed infra at notes 95, 98, 102, 104 and accompanying
text (using government purposes to limit the definitional scope of the Due Process Clause) and
Professor Ely, discussed infra at note 114 and accompanying text (using government purposes
to define "cruel and unusual" in the Eighth Amendment).
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Madisonian paradigm permits it selectively to avoid answering difficult empirical questions inherent in government interest analysis.
Government interests, like the forces besieging the city of Troy, have
infiltrated the bulwark of the Bill of Rights through deception rather
than superior force.
This Article is divided into two Sections. Section I explores the
philosophical premises of the Constitution, which I refer to as the
Madisonian paradigm, as they relate to the generally accepted interplay of the definition and application prongs. The classical view considers these prongs to be independent. This assumption of
independence underlies the choice of methodologies the Court
employs when it applies the Constitution to particular cases. In addition, Section I reviews the authorities traditionally relied upon to
interpret the Constitution and, in order to place government interests
analysis in context, outlines the manifold kinds of factfinding that
attend constitutional adjudication. This Section concludes by examining the various methods the Court uses to reconcile constitutional
rights and government interests.
Section II canvasses the Court's modern practice of defining and
applying the Constitution. This review demonstrates that the
processes of definition and application are not so neatly compartmentalized as traditional theory describes them. The Court regularly construes the Constitution with an eye, sometimes both eyes, on how the
various definitional choices will be applied. This Section also explores
the ways that the tacit mixing of definition and application invert the
fundamental premises of the Constitution's structure, subverting the
capacity to hold the Court accountable for its decisions. By shifting
the placement of government interest analysis, the Court subtly but
profoundly manipulates the course of constitutional discourse. This
veiled manipulation reduces the application prong to an undifferentiated and unverifiable extension of the definition prong. Definition and
application merge, while still the Court speaks of them as separate.
I.

THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

Constitutional adjudication proceeds on the basis of a small set of
fundamental operating assumptions. These assumptions reflect the
delicate accommodation inherent in the Constitution between
majoritarian will and individual liberty that the Court's constitutional
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jurisprudence undertakes to honor. The Court must respect the constitutional power of the majority, yet zealously guard against the use
of this power to violate constitutional rights; the Court must understand the basis for the majority's actions, yet never forget the reasons
the framers restricted the majority's power to act. This Section first
examines the philosophical middle course the framers navigated
between majoritarian power and the individual's right to be free of
this power, and then this Section reviews the structure of analysis the
Court brings to this journey.
A.

Madisonian Premises

The process of allocating "burdens of persuasion" according to
whether the Constitution is implicated responds to the perceived fundamental contradiction endemic to the American political system. In
what has been termed the Madisonian dilemma,7 the Constitution
establishes a political structure that juxtaposes one fundamental principle, that of majority rule, with the contrary fundamental principle
that individuals enjoy certain freedoms inviolate from the power of
the majority.' Judge Robert Bork described the resulting clash:
Majority tyranny occurs if legislation invades the areas properly left
to individual freedom. Minority tyranny occurs if the majority is prevented from ruling where its power is legitimate. Yet, quite obviously, neither the majority nor the minority can be trusted to define
the freedom of the other. This dilemma is resolved in constitutional
theory, and in popular understanding, by the Supreme Court's power
to define both majority and
minority freedom through the interpreta9
tion of the Constitution.
7 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. I,
3 (1971); see also Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory 22-24 (1956) (discussing
the operational meaning of "tyranny" in reconciling the dilemma).
8 See generally Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 865, 867 (1960),
stating:
The historical and practical purposes of a Bill of Rights, the very use of a written
constitution, indigenous to America, the language the Framers used, the kind of threedepartment government they took pains to set up, all point to the creation of a
government which was denied all power to do some things under any and all
circumstances, and all power to do other things except precisely in the manner
prescribed.
9 Bork, supra note 7, at 3; see also Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 39-41 (1990)
(expanding on the theme of the Madisonian dilemma). Madison probably would not have
fully shared Bork's description of the constitutional clash between the majority and the
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The Court's role in resolving the Madisonian dilemma brings about
what Alexander Bickel termed the "counter-majoritarian difficulty." 10
The Court's role is "difficult" because judicial review permits
unelected judges to substitute their views of the Constitution's provisions for those of popularly elected representatives. 1 Professor John
Hart Ely summarized the difficulty concisely: "[A] body that is not

elected or otherwise politically responsible in any significant way is
telling the people's elected representatives that they cannot govern as

they'd like." 12 The counter-majoritarian difficulty renders suspicious
too close judicial scrutiny of majoritarian action or too much solicitude of individual rights. Because of the primacy of this view, in the
judicial context, the majoritarian principle is privileged above the possible presence of individual rights.13 This prioritizing of fundamental
minority. Madison's specific concern with minority tyranny was not that the minority would
prevent a majority from ruling, but rather that a minority faction would legislate to the
detriment of a majority. Madison dismissed this concern with his usual dispatch: "If a faction
consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the
majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote." The Federalist No. 10, at 80 (James
Madison) (Mentor ed., 1961). Because Madison did not accept the contemporary view of
judicial review, it is not surprising that he did not contemplate the gloss Bork has placed on his
argument. For a more accurate description of Madison's own resolution of the dilemma, see
Robert J. Morgan, James Madison on the Constitution and the Bill of Rights 196 (1988)
(quoting Madison: "[T]he 'true and safe construction' [of the Constitution would come from
the] 'uniform sanction of successive legislative bodies; through a period of years and under the
varied ascendancy of parties."' (quoting 3 James Madison, Letters and Other Writings of
James Madison 228 (New York, Worthington 1884)); see also Dahl, supra note 7, at 23-24
(discussing possible definitions of "tyranny" within Madison's system). Still, Bork's modern
interpretation probably conforms to the "popular understanding" of the clash, and it serves as
a convenient vessel to explain the shifting burdens of persuasion in constitutional adjudication.
10Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 16 (1962); see also id. at 1-23
(discussing the dilemma); John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review
1-9 (1980) (discussing the dilemma in terms of "interpretivism" by the Court).
1I See Bickel, supra note 10, at 34-37. Paraphrasing and agreeing with James Bradley
Thayer, Bickel observed: "[E]very action of the other departments embodies an implicit
decision on their part that it was within their constitutional power to act as they did. The
judiciary must accord the utmost respect to this determination, even though it be a tacit one."
Id. at 35.
12 Ely, supra note 10, at 4-5.
13 The relationship between the popularly elected branches of government and the unelected
federal judiciary is undergoing considerable revision in the latest academic writings. In
particular, the heretofore generally accepted "majoritarian paradigm"-i.e., the primacy of
majoritarian decisionmaking-is being reconsidered. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword:
The Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43 (1989) (criticizing the Rehnquist court's
deference to the majoritarian values of the elected branches); Stephen M. Griffin, What is
Constitutional Theory? The Newer Theory and the Decline of the Learned Tradition, 62 S.
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principles gives rise to the shifting burdens in constitutional adjudication. Because this majoritarian perspective imparts a presumptive
validity to state action,14 the challenger of this action bears the initial
burden of persuading the Court that, in this case, an individual right
is being infringed. The specific purposes that motivated the action in
question are not pertinent at this point. Once a challenger is successful in establishing the existence of a constitutional right, however, the
Court intercedes to review the majority's actions under a level of scrutiny that varies with the perceived importance of the right. This
review brings into focus, for the first time, the specific reasons supporting the government's action.
The conventional view incorporating shifting burdens of persuasion
rests on the inherent assumption that constitutional interpretations
are derived independently of matters of constitutional application. 5
Fundamental to the American system is the belief that constitutional
rights are recognizable independently of the desires of the majority.
As Professor Robert A. Dahl explained, to allow the majority to
decide "whether the punishing of some specified act would or would
not be tyrannical... is precisely what Madison meant to prevent, and
moreover would make the concept of majority tyranny meaningless." 1 6 The meaning of the Constitution derives from factors outside
of the will of the majority. If the Constitution operates as a bulwark
against majority tyranny, the majority's reasons for acting cannot
define what actions constitute tyranny. The majority's intentions

Cal. L. Rev. 493, 506-14 (1989) (arguing that the realist theory of democracy, which assumes
the primacy of majoritarian decisionmaking, is simplistic and should be reconsidered);
Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893 (1990) (arguing that
the paradigm of "popular sovereignty" cannot be reconciled with our constitutional tradition,
and that we should abandon that effort and recognize the promise of the tradition we have
built). Central to the present thesis is the assumption that constitutional adjudication rests
squarely within the majoritarian paradigm. Commentators who question this paradigm do not
doubt its ascendancy, only its correctness. See Chemerinsky, supra, at 61. At bottom, I too
question its correctness, but I leave such doubts for another day.
14See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) ("The general
rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn
by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.")
15 See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Empirical Questions Without Empirical Answers,
1991 Wis. L. Rev. 569, 582-87 (criticizing the Court's use of "burdens of proof" in
constitutional challenges without reference to how the "right" is defined).
16Dahl, supra note 7, at 24.
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become relevant only subsequent to the determination of an individ-

ual constitutional right.
B.

The Components of the Madisonian Model

As conventionally understood, the Court ascertains the appropriate

level of review of government action through its reading of the Constitution. This review ranges from the extremely rare circumstance
when the right is deemed "absolute" and no government purpose will

justify its infringement to a variety of sliding scale tests and balancing
strategies that allow the government to override less fundamental
rights with much less justification. 17 This interpretation is primarily
normative,18 though it has significant empirical aspects.19 The
Court's subsequent review of government interests at the application

stage also has both a value component and an empirical component,
though at this stage the latter has somewhat greater significance. The
value component of constitutional application concerns the purpose
of the government action, whereas the empirical component concerns
the adequacy of the action to the accomplishment of the purpose.20 It
should be emphasized that the respective values of the definition and

application stages are distinct. When defining the Constitution, the
guiding values come from the diverse constitutional authorities
demarcating the contours of individual liberty; when applying the

Constitution, the guiding values come, explicitly or implicitly, from
the majoritarian forces responsible for the challenged action.
17This relativistic perspective has meant that the government bears the burden to justify
infringements of deeply perceived rights, whereas a challenger bears a continuing burden in
regard to government interference with rights of shallower dimensions. See Monahan &
Walker, supra note 15, at 582-89.
18See generally Michael J. Perry, Morality, Politics, and Law 121-79 (1988) (exploring the
relationship between morality and constitutional interpretation).
19For a discussion of the empirical components of the interpretation prong, see David L.
Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of
Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541 (1991).
20 The Court's statement of the rational basis test in United States v. Carolene Products,
304 U.S. 144, 152-54 (1938) illustrates the essentially factual nature of the test:
[R]egulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some
rational basis ....
... [Our inquiry] must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts either
known or which could reasonably be assumed affords support for it.
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1. The Definition Prong: Identifying Individual Rights
For most scholars, the definition prong represents the sum and substance of constitutional law. In the last thirty years, the volume of

scholarly commentary on constitutional theory has vastly increased.21
This prodigious literature seeks to identify the boundaries, if any, on
the legitimate exercise of the Court's interpretive powers.2 2 Stated
simply, the Court and the commentators overwhelmingly seek the

meaning of the Constitution.23
Broken down into its constituent parts, the definition prong of constitutional interpretation consists of two queries. The first and threshold question asks whether the Constitution is implicated at all; the
second asks how deeply the Constitution is implicated-in other
words, how "fundamental" the right is.24 The principal criterion for

answering these questions is the constitutional text. Commentators
agree, however, that the text alone cannot provide determinate
answers to the sundry questions put to it.25 With varying degrees of
agreement, a number of supplemental authorities have been accepted
21 See Griffin, supra note 13, at 493-94 nn.3-4; see generally Laurence E. Wiseman, The
New Supreme Court Commentators: The Principled, the Political and the Philosophical, 10
Hastings Const. L.Q. 315 (1983) (discussing old and new constitutional theory and the views
of various commentators).
22 See Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. Cal. L. Rev. 399, 399 (1985) ("In one way or
another, virtually every constitutional theorist deems it primarily important to address the
same question: where should we go in search of guiding principles for interpreting the

linguistically open-ended clauses of the Constitution .

..") (footnote omitted).

23 See Michael J. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights: An Inquiry into
the Legitimacy of Constitutional Policymaking by the Judiciary 10 (1982)
[I]nterpretive review ... ascertains the constitutionality of a given policy choice by
reference to one of the value judgments of which the Constitution consists-that is, by
reference to a value judgment embodied, though not necessarily explicitly, either in
some particular provision of the text of the Constitution or in the overall structure of
government ordained by the Constitution."
Id. (emphasis omitted).
24 These two questions are often not separated clearly, but the second logically follows only
from an affirmative answer to the first.
25 Professor Leonard Levy put it this way: "Justices who look to the Constitution for more
than a puzzling, if majestic, phrase might just as well turn to the comic strips for all the
guidance they will find on how to decide most of the great cases that involve national public
policy." Leonard W. Levy, Introduction to American Constitutional Law 1, 1 (Leonard W.
Levy ed., 1966). See generally Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 204, 205 (1980) ("The text of the Constitution is authoritative,
but many of its provisions are treated as inherently open-textured."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A
Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1189,
1244 (1987) ("[W]hile arguments from text occupy the topmost rung of the theoretical
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as necessary to fill the gaps in the text, including original intent (history),26 precedent,27 constitutional factfinding, 2 8 constitutional scholarship, 29 and contemporary values.3 0 These sources mark the
boundaries of the Constitution and indicate the depth of implicated
rights.
The legitimacy of government power depends also on the purpose
behind its exercise. Constitutionally, government purposes are evaluated by the light of the defined right. The more deeply revered the
right, the more light is cast upon the government's reasons for exercising its power. Applying the Constitution requires scrutiny ofwith varying degrees of rigor-the reasons justifying government
action and the efficacy of that action to its stated purpose.
2.

The Application Prong:Assessing Government Interests

Although the definition prong might appear to be the more engaging component of constitutional adjudication, it is only the first step
in a two-step process. The application component is considered less
interesting under the conventional model, because this stage seems to
hierarchy, it seldom occurs that purely textual arguments unambiguously require a result
contrary to that indicated by several other factors.").
Commentators are not unanimous on this point, however. Despite the general recognition
that "'We are all realists now,"' John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Science in Law:
Cases and Materials 27 (2d ed. 1990), some courts and commentators continue to speak as
though the meaning of the Constitution can be derived in ethereal abstractness, free of all
earthly bounds. This oversight is troubling, for the social context exerts an imperious influence
over constitutional adjudication. See David A.J. Richards, Pornography Commissions and the
First Amendment: On Constitutional Values and Constitutional Facts, 39 Me. L. Rev. 275,
312-13 (1987) ("One of the most important, yet least examined, issues in public law is the way
in which constitutional principles are or should be sensitive to related factual inquiries....").
See generally Faigman, supra note 19, at 547 (examining the way in which constitutional
principles are affected by related factual inquiries).
26 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 360
(1981) (stating that "original intent is the proper mode of ascertaining constitutional
meaning").
27 See, e.g., Julius Stone, Precedent and Law: Dynamic of Common Law Gender 8 (1985)
("Constitutionality issues involve ...the meaning of preceding judicial decisions interpreting
the texts."); see also Monaghan, supra note 26, at 360 ("[I]mportant concessions must now be
made to the claims of stare decisis.").
28 See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 19, at 548 ("Facts guide and restrain constitutional
interpretation in the same way as the other elements of constitutional theory.").
29 See Ely, supra note 10, at 56 (noting that many commentators have urged judges to
engage in some form of "moral philosophy" when deciding constitutional questions).
30 See, e.g., Brest, supra note 25, at 228 ("Precedents are modified and even overruled to
reflect perceived changes in social needs and values.").
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require merely overlaying the particular interpretation atop the government's action to assess the fit. This "mechanical jurisprudence"
hardly can be expected to pique the constitutionally curious.31 In
actuality, however, the application prong regularly provides the
authority for particular results. If the Constitution is implicated, the
Court must determine its full meaning, and this done, review the purposes behind the government action in the light of this interpretation.
The empirical connection between the government's purposes and the
complained-of action thus becomes of constitutional concern. The
Court must review the factual nexus between the action and the government's reasons for acting. This review requires the Court to face
constitutional facts.
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis described two basic kinds of facts
having evidentiary significance: legislative facts and adjudicative
facts.32 Legislative facts are those facts that transcend the particular
dispute and inform legal reasoning and the construction of legal
rules.33 Adjudicative facts are those facts particular to the dispute.34
This dichotomy roughly represents that kind of factfinding that takes
place in constitutional adjudication. Davis' adjudicative fact category
has a direct analogue in what might be termed "constitutional-adjudicative" facts. His legislative fact category can be further refined into
two subcategories, "constitutional-rule" facts and "constitutionalreview" facts. 35 Constitutional-rulefacts are relied upon to substantiate a particular construction of the Constitution. They are used to
establish the meaning of the Constitution and thus are relevant at the
definition stage. Constitutional-review facts, on the other hand,
become relevant at the application stage. Courts examine constitutional-review facts, which typically serve as the basis for the govern31The "mechanical jurisprudence" of constitutional adjudication is not unlike that decried
by legal realists in the early portion of this century. The realists focused the law's attention on
the application of the law-on legal outcomes rather than legal logic. For a thorough history
of legal realism, see John H. Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science:
From the Yale Experience, 28 Buff. L. Rev. 459 (1979).
32 Kenneth C. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 402-03 (1942).
33 See Fed. R. Evid. 201(a) Notes of Advisory Committee on 1972 Proposed Rules

("Legislative facts.., are those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking
process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the
enactment of a legislative body.").
34 See id.; Davis, supra note 32, at 402.

35 For a general discussion of these subcategories, see Faigman, supra note 19, at 552-56.
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ment's action, under a chosen level of scrutiny in order to determine

the constitutionality of the government's action.
Perhaps the most straightforward example of a constitutional-rule
fact comes from Gibbons v. Ogden. 36 Chief Justice John Marshall
observed in Gibbons that "[a]U America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce,' to comprehend navigation."' 37
Marshall's empirical belief regarding the general
understanding of "all America" buttressed his reading of the Com-

merce Clause. Research demonstrating the incorrectness of this belief
would have weakened, though probably not changed, his conclusion.
Throughout its history, the Court has advanced empirical propositions to buttress its reading of the Constitution.3 8
More important for present purposes is the second form of constitutionally based legislative factfinding, constitutional-review facts.39
Constitutional-review facts encompass the vast number of cases in
which the Court evaluates the factual basis supporting the government's reasons for acting. McGowan v. Maryland40 provides a
straightforward example. Appellants complained that Maryland's
Sunday Closing Laws, which exempted such items as gasoline, fruit,
36 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
37 Id. at 190.

38 See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978) (setting the constitutional floor for
jury size at six on the basis of empirical research on jury functioning with fewer than twelve
members); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (basing the parameters of the right of
reproductive choice on medical technology); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294
(1954) (basing a constitutional right to integrated schooling on the empirical fact that separate
schools were not equal); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905) (assuming equality of
bargaining power between employer and employee as support for constitutional protection of
liberty of contract); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (ICranch) 137, 176-77 (1803) (implicitly
assuming that legislators would be less faithful to a written Constitution than judges as support
for judicial review). For a more expansive discussion of these and other cases see Faigman,
supra note 19, at 556-64.
39 Constitutional-review facts are usefully contrasted with "constitutional-adjudicative
facts." Once the Court determines the relevance of a constitutional rule, one of two types of
constitutional fact presents itself. If the fact is particular to the dispute, it can be termed a
constitutional-adjudicative fact. Juries are primarily responsible for resolving constitutionaladjudicative facts, although the standard of review of these findings has been the subject of
some debate. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 Colum. L.
Rev. 229, 230-34 (1985) (discussing "the scope of judicial review of the adjudicative facts
decisive of constitutional claims"). By far the more prevalent kind of fact in constitutional
adjudication is the constitutional-review fact.
40 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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newspapers, and drugs, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The
Court observed:
It would seem that a legislature could reasonably find that the Sunday sale of the exempted commodities was necessary either for the
health of the populace or for the enhancement of the recreational
atmosphere of the day-that a family which takes a Sunday ride into
the country will need gasoline for the automobile and may find pleasant a soft drink or fresh fruit; ... that newspapers and drug products
should always be available to the public.
The record is barren of any indication that this apparently reasonable basis does not exist, that the statutory distinctions are invidious,
that local tradition and custom might not rationally call for this legislative treatment. 4 '
The Court examines constitutional-review facts with varying
degrees of rigor. As indicated by the excerpt above, the McGowan
Court reviewed the factual basis for the Maryland law under a
rational basis standard. This standard involves the most cursory
review of the reasons behind the government's action. Other laws
might demand greater scrutiny. If the law burdens fundamental
rights or discriminates against "discrete and insular minorities," the
Court reviews the government's reasons with great care. For
instance, a state law barring the Sunday sale of only newspapers and
magazines would invite the most exacting scrutiny. The magnitude of
the review performed at the application stage thus seems to depend
simply on the substantive interpretation fixed upon at the definition
stage. The main thesis of this Article, of course, is that these stages
are not treated as separately as is commonly thought and thus the
connection between definition and application is not as simple as it
appears. Before endeavoring to prove my thesis, however, it is necessary first to consider the variety of strategies the Court uses to manage
the intersection between definition and application.
3.

Definition Meets Application: Reconciling Individual Rights and
Government Interests

Although the Madisonian model illustrates the immanent clash of
rights and interests in constitutional adjudication, the meeting of definition and application varies markedly in different constitutional con41 Id. at 426.
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texts. The Court employs a wide range of methods to reconcile
individual rights with competing government interests.4" This methodological spectrum encompasses at one pole absolute-category definition, and at the other ad hoc balancing. This spectrum of
constitutional methods represents, in theory, the varying degrees to
which the Court "balances" or accounts for competing government
interests in the process of interpreting the Constitution. The absolutecategorical methodologist seeks to discern finite categories in the Constitution. Asserted rights falling within a category receive absolute
protection, but claimed rights that do not fit into a category receive no
protection. In marked contrast, the ad hoc balancing methodologist
attempts to identify those constitutional principles implicated by the
case and weighs them against countervailing governmental interests
on a case-by-case basis. Between these methodological extremes lie
methods that incorporate category definition and balancing in varying
degrees. Included on this spectrum would be nonabsolute category
definition, definitional balancing, and multitiered balancing. The system's Madisonian premises, however, lurk within each method of constitutional adjudication irrespective of where it is located on this
spectrum.
The categorical mode of adjudication is probably the quintessential
method of constitutional interpretation. The primary object of the
categorical method is to fix the scope of the Constitution's meaning
from case to case through analogy and definition.4 3 For example, in
Maryland v. Craig,44 the Court considered whether the Sixth Amendment's guaranty that a defendant have the right "to be confronted
with the witnesses against him" 4 was violated when the victim-witness (a six-year-old child) testified by means of a one-way closed circuit television. Justice Antonin Scalia, a strong proponent of the
categorical method, 46 argued in dissent that "'to confront' plainly
means to encounter face-to-face." 47 This imperative was obviously
42 See generally Craig R. Ducat, Modes of Constitutional Interpretation (1978) (discussing
the "major schools" of constitutional interpretation which have grown out of Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison).
43 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale L.J.
943, 949-50 (1987).
44 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
45 U.S. Const. amend. VI.
46 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989).
47 Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3173 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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violated in Craig. Under Scalia's view, the government's reasons for
removing the witness from the courtroom were not pertinent to the
constitutional inquiry. The Constitution set forth the "confrontation"
principle and the present case ran afoul of that categorical requirement. The government's action, though presumptively valid, must be
invalidated when opposed by a clearly announced constitutional right.
In this absolute form, categorical definitions admit no exceptions
and thus the government's reasons for acting become irrelevant. The
Constitution rarely permits such an absolutist approach, however,
and the Court even more rarely invokes this method.48 Because the
categorical method comes to admit exceptions, the Court finds itself
increasingly in the business of balancing the constitutional right with
the government's reasons for infringing upon that right. On the spectrum of constitutional methods, constitutional balancing assumes a
49
variety of forms.
Close to the categorical approach is "definitional balancing," in
which the Court assesses the weight of the right implicated by a particular government action against the gravity of the government's
interest in acting. 0 Once this calculus is completed, the result is
applied to future cases in the same inexorable fashion as interpretations devised under the categorical method. Definitional balancing
remains faithful to Madisonian premises in theory, as the balancing
metaphor itself symbolizes, by placing individual rights on one scale
1 illusand government purposes on another. New York v. Ferber"
trates definitional balancing in the context in which it first gained
ascendancy, the First Amendment. 2 In Ferber,the Court reviewed a
New York criminal law that prohibited persons from "knowingly promoting sexual performances by children under the age of 16 by dis48See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 90 ("Because no constitutional rights are absolute,
virtually every constitutional case involves the question whether the government's action is
justified by a sufficient purpose.").
49 See, e.g., Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 Yale L.J. 1424,

1434-35 (1962); Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First
Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 935, 942-45
(1968).

5oSee generally Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 2.03 (1984)
(discussing definitional balancing).

51458 U.S. 747 (1982).
52 See Nimmer, supra note 49, at 942.
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tributing material which depicts such performances. '5 3 Although the
law infringed First Amendment speech, the Court sustained it on the
basis of the "surpassing importance" of the government interest in
preventing the "sexual exploitation and abuse of children. ' - 4 Justice
Byron R. White, writing for the Court, found the value of child pornography to be, at best, minimal. When balancing this right against
the overwhelming government interest in protecting the welfare of
children, he concluded, "no process of case-by-case adjudication is
required."55
Multitiered tests are a special form of definitional balancing, which
perhaps best exemplify the shifting burdens of persuasion inherently a
part of constitutional adjudication. For example, the Court has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
mandate a three-tiered analysis that directs its review of government
purposes and describes the corresponding burdens of persuasion. 6
For rights at the core of the clause, the Court strictly scrutinizes the
state action and requires the state to demonstrate that its action is
necessary to accomplish a compelling government interest. At the
clause's periphery, the Court employs minimal scrutiny and requires
the challenger to demonstrate that the state action is not rationally
related to a legitimate state interest. 58 Certain rights situated between
the core and the periphery receive intermediate scrutiny, a standard
that retains but reduces the burden on the state, requiring it to
demonstrate that its action is substantially related to an important
government interest.5 9 The level of scrutiny, then, ostensibly depends
53

458 U.S. at 749.

54 Id. at 757.
55 Id. at 764.

56 See John E. Nowak, Ronald D. Rotunda & J. Nelson Young, Constitutional Law 530-31
(3d ed. 1986). See generally Monahan & Walker, supra note 15, at 582-89 (using equal
protection analysis to describe the allocation of the burden of persuasion in constitutional
adjudication).
57 See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984).
58 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (Under the minimal
scrutiny applied by the Court, "[i]t [was] enough that there [was] an evil at hand for
correction, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational
way to correct it."); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331-32 (1981) (Under the rational basis
test legislation can be invalidated only "by a clear showing of arbitrariness and irrationality.").
59 See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to gender-based classifications); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388
(1979) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a classification based on illegitimacy).
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on the Court's construction of the Constitution. Once the standard of
review is established according to the individual interest affected, the
Court applies this standard when reviewing the government interests.
For the time being, this area of the law remains quasicategorical in
that cases are fitted into one of the preexisting tiers of analysis.'
Standing at the opposite pole from the categorical approach, along
the spectrum of constitutional methods, is "ad hoc balancing. ' 61 In
its most extreme form, ad hoc balancing involves a gestaltian assessment and reconciliation of all of the rights and interests presented in
the particular case. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the
Court in Maryland v. Craig,6 2 approached this extreme form of balancing in ruling on the constitutionality of permitting a child molestation victim to testify against the defendant via closed-circuit
television. Under her view, the Sixth Amendment's "'!preference for
face-to-face confrontation'... 'must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.' "63 O'Connor
assessed the depth of the defendant's right to face his accuser and
concluded that it did not invariably outweigh the state's significant
interests in child abuse cases. She explained that the Constitution
requires district courts to determine on a case-by-case basis whether
the psychological needs of the individual child outweigh the right of
the defendant to confront his accuser."
As the metaphor of a spectrum of methods suggests, the particular
strategy the Court applies in a given case might fall between the methods described above or constitute a hybrid of one or more of these
methods. Consistent across this spectrum, however, is the Madis60 Many Justices and commentators have observed that the multitiered methodology, which
began with two tiers and now has three, is moving inexorably toward a more "sliding-scale"
form of balancing. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Cracks in the Structure: The Coming
Breakdown of the Levels of Scrutiny, 45 Ohio St. L.J. 161, 163 (1984).

See generally

Aleinikoff, supra note 43, at 968 (comparing the increasing move to case-by-case "sliding
scale" balancing in the First Amendment context to developments under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
61 Nimmer, supra note 50, at § 2.02.
62 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
63 Id. at 3165 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) and quoting Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895), respectively).
64 Id. at 3169. O'Connor used the definitional balancing method in Craig to derive an ad
hoc balancing rule. Use of the definitional balancing method to derive an ad hoc balancing
rule is not unusual. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 26 (1981).
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onian premise that in principle, interpretation should be separated
from application.
Contrary to the requirements of these conventional premises, however, the Court often threads the state's reasons for acting into its

construction of the Constitution. The hermetic seal encircling the
definition prong has been broken, and the Court's failure to recognize

the breach has resulted in broad areas of constitutional incoherence.
By incorporating majoritarian purposes into defining rights, the Court
regularly misallocates the burdens of persuasion. The principal issue

in government interests analysis concerns the factual nexus between
the asserted state interest and the challenged state action. Hence, as

the application prong increasingly intrudes into the definition prong,
these empirical questions are evaluated as a part of constitutional construction and the burden for demonstrating them rests upon the challenger of government action.

II.

TURNING MADISON ON

His HEAD

Although the philosophical premises of the Constitution recommend a rigid separation of definition from application, the daily practice of constitutional adjudication belies this principle.6 5 Close
analysis of the Court's opinions reveals how significantly government
purposes influence the threshold interpretive inquiry, thus undermining any rational allocation of burdens of proving pertinent empirical
matters. This Section examines how the background noise of government interests has confused the Court's jurisprudence.6 6

65 For the present, I assume that the Madisonian model provides the best blueprint for
constitutional adjudication and thus that, in practice, the art of construing the Constitution
can be separated from the science of applying it. This assumption, however, is by no means a
necessary or accurate one. I accept it here because the Court accepts it. The Court describes
its work in accordance with Madisonian principles. It attempts to divine rights that, only once
ascertained, are assessed against the government's interest in infringing them. This is
significant because it means that the Court speaks of the presumptive validity of state action
and the need to allocate burdens of persuasion on the basis of its reading of the Constitution.
66 This Section is organized around the spectrum of constitutional methods identified in
Section I as marking the meeting ground of definition and application. This organization was
selected more out of convenience than principle. The reader need not fully accept my
placement of cases to agree with my central thesis.
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A. An Introductory Exemplar: Defining the "'FreeExercise
of Religion"
As noted above, of the sundry constitutional methods, the categorical mode probably appears to incorporate Madisonian principles the
most scrupulously by rigidly separating definitional matters from
application concerns and thus retaining the bulwark character of the
Bill of Rights. The Constitution demarcates areas of individual liberty that-at least in the abstract-are beyond the reach of
majoritarian meddling. For this reason, I use the Court's recent decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith, 67 a particularly good illustration of the categorical method, to
provide an introductory overview of the Court's violation of the
Madisonian structure. Moreover, the dissenting and concurring opinions in Smith neatly encapsulate two other ways in which the Court
reconciles individual rights with government purposes. The Smith
decision, therefore, both illustrates how the Court mixes together the
two prongs of conventional analysis and, by its concurring and dissenting opinions, serves as a springboard for an examination of the
texture of this mixture along the constitutional spectrum.
In Smith, the Court considered whether Oregon could constitutionally deny unemployment benefits to an American Indian dismissed
from his job for the "religiously inspired" use of peyote.68 Justice
Scalia framed the issue in Smith as involving the scope of the Free
Exercise Clause. A review of the Court's cases, he observed, indicated
that the denial of benefits under the present circumstances did not
implicate free exercise rights that would trigger application of a compelling interests test. 69 Indeed, Scalia rejected the use of the compelling interest test in free exercise cases as an "anomaly."'7

Although

Scalia's conclusion is based on a multitude of factors, principal among
these is the combination of the government's need to regulate con67 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
68 Id. at 876.

69 A precursor of Smith is Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986), in which the Court refused
to extend the compelling interest test of the Free Exercise Clause to "a religiously based
objection to the statutory requirements that a Social Security number be provided by an
applicant seeking to receive certain welfare benefits." Id. at 695. Chief Justice Warren E.
Burger, writing for the Court, held that when a "facially neutral and uniformly applicable
requirement" burdens religious conduct, the government must show only that the requirement
"is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest." Id. at 707-08.

70 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886.
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trolled substances71 and concern over the effects of subjecting all similar government regulations to the rigors of the compelling interest
standard.7 2 Scalia thus defined the Free Exercise Clause to exclude
"religiously inspired" peyote use largely on the basis of the state's
pressing need to regulate drug use in a uniform manner.7 3

Justice O'Connor, who concurred in the Court's judgment, wrote
separately to express her inability to square Scalia's reading of the
Free Exercise Clause with case law and common understanding. She
observed, "It is difficult to deny that a law that prohibits religiously
motivated conduct, even if the law is generally applicable, does not at
least implicate First Amendment concerns."'74 Thus implicated, the

Free Exercise Clause requires the Court to scrutinize the basis for the
government action. 75 This scrutiny involves a particularized review
of the facts, with the government bearing the burden of persuasion:

"Even if, as an empirical matter, a government's criminal laws might
usually serve a compelling interest in health, safety, or public order,
71 See id. at 885 ("The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of
socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, 'cannot
depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual
development.' ") (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,
451 (1988)).
Similarly, in Bowen, a principal justification for applying minimal scrutiny was the
government's interests in administering its welfare system. Justice O'Connor dissented,
arguing that the compelling interest standard applied and that the government had not
produced any evidence to meet it. 476 U.S. at 730. It is useful to compare O'Connor's opinion
in Bowen, in which she found that the state failed to carry its burden, with her opinion in
Smith, in which she believed that the state met its burden. See infra notes 74-77 and
accompanying text. See also Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the
Smith Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109, 1126-27 (1990) (comparing Bowen and Smith).
72 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.
If the "compelling interest" test is to be applied at all, then, it must be applied across
the board, to all actions thought to be religiously commanded. Moreover, if
"compelling interest" really means what it says (and watering it down here would
subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many laws will not meet the test.
Id.
73 The following passage captures Scalia's majoritarian perspective:
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a
relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in
which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social
importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.
Id. at 890.
74 Id. at 893-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
75 Id. at 901-02 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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the First Amendment at least requires a case-by-case determination of
the question, sensitive to the facts of each particular claim."' 76 After
reviewing the present facts under the compelling interest standard,
O'Connor concluded that the denial of benefits did not offend the
Free Exercise Clause.77

In reaching this conclusion, O'Connor accepted on its face the government's argument that grave harm would result if the petitioners
were exempted from the state's general prohibition on peyote use.
The government thus met its burden of persuasion under the strictest
level of scrutiny simply by announcing the reason for its actions.
The dissenters, on the other hand, applied a more exacting level of
scrutiny. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, joined by Justice William J.
Brennan and Justice Thurgood Marshall, argued that the Constitution's compelling interest test requires the government to prove the
necessity of its action: "[T]his Court's prior decisions have not
allowed a government to rely on mere speculation about potential
harms, but have demanded evidentiary support for a refusal to allow a
religious exception. ' 78 When the compelling interest standard can be
met on the basis of "mere speculation," the judicial scrutiny applied is
strict in name alone. Blackmun's demand for "proof" of the social
harm supposedly addressed by the government's action forms a
greater barrier to overcome.79

In the end, O'Connor shared Scalia's conclusion that under the
facts of Smith no constitutional violation had occurred. Yet she
reached this conclusion in a very different way. Scalia evaluated the
basis for the state action in the process of defining the scope of the
Free Exercise Clause; O'Connor defined the Free Exercise Clause first
and then weighed this defined right against the reasons for the state
action. Their convergence in outcome is intelligible if the government
interests were sufficiently compelling and demonstrable-if in meeting
O'Connor's strict scrutiny they naturally satisfied Scalia's cursory
76 Id. at 899 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
77Id. at 905-07 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
78 Id. at 911 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
79The difficult and complex issue raised by Blackmun's dissent is whether under heightened
scrutiny the state must produce "proof" of the existence of facts supporting its action or
whether reasoned argument will suffice. Indeed, the question of the nature of the burden of
proof that different standards of review place upon the government naturally follows from the

arguments made here. I must defer consideration of this important issue to another article.
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review. Alternatively, and more likely, this convergence is a function
of O'Connor's deferential strict scrutiny review. Scalia and O'Connor
reviewed the government's reasons with similar exactitude, but with
Scalia working in the definition prong and O'Connor working in the
application prong. Although the effects of these two interpretive
strategies look the same, the choice of prong itself has great constitutional significance.
The point at which the government interests are evaluated is much
more than a procedural nicety. At the definition stage the Madisonian paradigm demands a very different standard of review than is
required at the application stage. Government interests relied upon
when defining the constitutional text are not reviewed substantively.
In Smith, the pertinent issue at the definition stage concerned the
parameters of free exercise, and Scalia merely identified the government's interests in the matter. Indeed, under Scalia's approach, at the
threshold of constitutional adjudication, the challenger effectively
bears the burden of proving that there is no rational nexus between
the regulation and a legitimate government interest, because she is
invoking the Constitution to defeat the majority will. By incorporating governmental purposes into the definition prong, rather than
reviewing these interests when applying the principles derived
through interpretation, the Court shifts the burden of demonstrating
the empirical propositions that refute or support the government's
action from the state to the challenger.8 0
O'Connor and Blackmun, on the other hand, both employed a multitiered balancing method that kept the empirical burden on the government, although they disagreed on how to read the result. Because
O'Connor did not require the state to introduce research demonstrating that its action was necessary to accomplish a compelling state
interest, the real burden on the state was slight. Yet, disagreements
with O'Connor are easier to perceive, because she articulated the conflict between individual rights and government interests in a tradi80 See generally Richard K. Sherwin, Rhetorical Pluralism and the Discourse Ideal:
Countering Division of Employment v. Smith, A Parable of Pagans, Politics, and Majoritarian
Rule, 85 Nw. U.L. Rev. 388, 423 (1991) ("[T"he majority in Smith not only abandons
principled discourse, but explicitly defers to the political process and its dominant discourse of
pluralist bargaining among competing interests. The institutional role of judicial review thus
blends into legislative policy management. As a result, the judiciary's check upon the
legislature is lost.").
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tional manner. Readers can disagree with O'Connor over whether the
state met a sufficient burden in light of the rights at stake.81 In contrast, Scalia's categorical method evaded any empirical analysis by
removing it to the definition prong. There, government interests do
not compete with individual rights but merely assist in the construction of those rights. The balancing formula advanced by O'Connor
and Blackmun, then, adheres to Madisonian principles with greater
fidelity in that it separates rights and interests onto different scales for
weighing.82
Although Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Smith generally conformed to the Madisonian paradigm, the facility with which she
found that the government met the compelling interest standard
might leave the reader in some despair. At the least, O'Connor's concurrence raises a couple of questions for the present thesis. First of
all, does it really matter for constitutional theory whether the Court
analyzes government interests in the application prong or in the definition prong if, as evidenced in Smith, their placement does not necessarily affect the result? There are several possible responses to this
query. Initially, simply as a matter of intellectual integrity, judges
should say what they are doing. Defining a right differs markedly
from evaluating the government's justification for infringing a right.
Justice O'Connor's opinion, though having little persuasive potency,
at least conforms to the basic operating premises of the Constitution.
Moreover, not all opinions which merge definition and application do
so as clearly as Scalia's in Smith. By beclouding its operating premises, the Court is able to skirt significant scholarly criticism. Clarifying the stages of constitutional analysis should lead to clearer and
more consistent opinions. Justice O'Connor, for instance, should be
expected to clarify what, if any, empirical research should be pro8 3
duced by the government to meet the compelling interest standard;
s See McConnell, supra note 71, at 1113 (noting that the result of the compelling interest
test in Smith is "a close question").
82 Balancing formulas do not guarantee adherence to such principles. See infra Section
II.B. for examples of the Court's failure to separate interpretation matters from application
matters in different balancing contexts.
83 Justice O'Connor has been quite inconsistent on the issue of the quantum of proof
necessary to meet the compelling interest standard. As noted supra note 71, she explicitly
called for empirical research under this standard in Bowen v. Roy. And just this last term she
joined Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent in Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992),

criticizing the plurality for "blithely dispens[ing] with the need for factual findings" under the
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and Justice Scalia should have to defend his methodological sloppiness. To be sure, the ultimate value choices or conclusions of constitutional adjudication can usually be defended, even if only weakly; it
is the structure of constitutional argument that is most susceptible to
critical review and critical check. Just because constitutional theory
indicates that a particular course should be followed does not mean
that the Court will follow it. The force of constitutional commentary
resides in its ability to lay bare erroneous assumptions and inconsistent logic in order to expose the weaknesses of the argument. It can
only be hoped that future courts will follow a truer course.
Still, another question persists: What advantage does the Court
gain by importing government interests into the definition prong in
this way? The answer is that this strategy permits the Court to avoid
a host of difficulties that would emerge if it followed Madisonian principles too religiously. At bottom, government interests analysis rests
on the factual foundation supporting the government's reasons for
acting. Constitutional factfinding, however, has not been an area of
distinction for the Court. 4 In a great many cases, the constitutional
facts of relevance involve complex psychological or sociological mat85
ters that make sound empirical investigation difficult or impossible.
These constitutional facts create problems in two particular ways.
First, because these constitutional facts, which are so necessary to
constitutional lawmaking, are often uncertain or unavailable, a risk
exists that, as interpreted, the bedrock of the Constitution will rest on
shaky ground. This quandary has troubled the Court, because understrict scrutiny standard. Id. at 1863 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Burson, the Court upheld
Tennessee's prohibition on campaign activity within 100 feet of an entrance to a polling place.
Justice Stevens' criticism in Burson could easily be directed at O'Connor's opinion in Smith:
[A]Ithough the plurality recognizes the problematic character of Tennessee's contentbased suppressive regulation it nonetheless upholds the statute because "there is simply
no evidence" that commercial or charitable solicitation outside the polling place poses
the same potential dangers as campaigning outside the polling place. This analysis
contradicts a core premise of strict scrutiny-namely, that the heavy burden of
justification is on the State. The plurality has effectively shifted the burden of proving
the necessity of content discrimination from the State to the plaintiff.
Id. at 1866 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
84 See Faigman, supra note 19, at 564 ("Constitutional facts [are] only roughly based on
empirical reality; they exist[ ] in a nether world, somewhere within the Constitution itself.");
Richards, supra note 25, at 313-17 (using the Court's equal protection decisions to illustrate

both the importance that constitutional facts assume in constitutional interpretation and the
difficulty inherent in passing judgment on those underlying empirical facts).
85 See Faigman, supra note 19, at 606.
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standably it does not want its pronouncements to depend on incomplete and changeable factual information.86 The Madisonian
framework, with its shifting burdens of persuasion, avoids this problem, at least in theory. By imposing the burden of persuasion on one
of the parties, the framework seemingly puts the problem of ambiguous or unavailable information beyond the Court's reach. The party
bearing the burden of persuasion simply loses under conditions of
ambiguity. Because the Constitution established who would bear this
burden, the law progressed apparently free of the ambiguities of
factflnding. The distribution of burdens which the framework establishes, however, gives rise to the second type of problem.
Traditional constitutional analysis allocates the burden of demonstrating pertinent constitutional facts to the state when deeply perceived rights are implicated. When the prospect of obtaining valid
empirical research appears remote, the Court hesitates before giving
the state a burden that it can never meet. The Court has two alternatives in such cases if it is not going to find that the government always
loses when the factual basis for its action cannot be empirically
demonstrated. The Court could relax its close scrutiny of deeply
revered rights and not require any social or empirical research from
the state. O'Connor's opinion in Smith is an example of this strategy.
She conducted a perfunctory review of the asserted basis for the government action and found it compelling. The obvious problem with
this strategy is that the precedent of not requiring proof weakens close
scrutiny of state action in other cases. Moreover, it is subject to
intense criticism from other Justices and commentators who lament
the state of judicial protection of individual rights.
The second option is to transpose the factual premises of government interests analysis into rights definition as Scalia did in Smith.
86 In Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986), for example, Justice William H. Rehnquist
(now Chief Justice) vehemently criticized the empirical research introduced to support the
petitioner's contention that removing jurors who oppose capital punishment would result in a
jury biased in favor of conviction. Nonetheless, Rehnquist went on to find that even if research
reliably demonstrated such conviction-prone juries, these facts would not constitute a

constitutional violation. Rehnquist thus crafted his decision so that it would not rest on
vulnerable ground. See Samuel R. Gross, Overruled: Jury Neutrality in Capital Cases,
Stanford Law., Fall 1986 at 11, 13 (noting that a decision based solely on the insufficiency of
the evidence tending to prove that prodeath penalty juries are unfairly conviction-prone
"would have been an invitation for future litigation based on additional studies and even fuller
records").
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This removes the burden of producing social authority entirely from
the state. The elegance-and deceptiveness--of this strategy lies in its
capacity to make constitutional decisions that actually rest on uncertain factual moorings appearto rest on the solid bedrock of deference
to majoritarian decisionmaking. By selectively incorporating government interests into rights definition, the Court can avoid the weaknesses associated with constitutional factfinding.
Close study of the Court's cases demonstrates that it increasingly
avoids placing too great a burden on the state by using the government's reasons for infringing an individual right to define that right.
This practice means that the state need not meet a heavy burden to
justify infringements of fundamental liberties, because the Court uses
the government's justifications to redefine the liberties as nonfundamental, if not nonexistent. Of course, the factual questions remain an
integral part of the constitutional scheme, but now the challenger of
state action suffers the ambiguity of empirical research. This technique also permits the Court to avoid explicitly relying upon constitutional facts. Hence, the Court can proceed with constitutional
interpretation as though it were not dependent on unreliable facts
when, in reality, its very core is infested with factual ambiguity. The
next Section examines this practice across the full spectrum of constitutional methodologies.
B.

Reconciling Individual Rights and Government InterestsAlong
the Spectrum of ConstitutionalMethods

The Court uses widely varying methods to reconcile majoritarian
power with individual liberty in different constitutional contexts. The
Madisonian structure, however, informs the Court's method throughout all contexts. Although different constitutional provisions have
varied histories, they all share the fundamental principle of accommodation between the majority and the individual. But the Court, in
attempting to traverse this path, increasingly appears to have lost its
bearings. This Section traces the erratic course the Court has pursued
and examines how the Madisonian ideal has become despoiled across
the spectrum of constitutional methods.
1.

Category Definition

The threshold question in all constitutional adjudication asks
whether the Constitution is implicated. Thus, all constitutional meth-
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ods contain some categorical attributes. Irrespective of the method
the Court eventually adopts to resolve particular conflicts of individual rights and government interests, it must first determine the constitutional category into which the rights fall. The Court has no
authority to review the inherent validity of state action on other than
constitutional grounds. If the Constitution is implicated, however,
the full spectrum of constitutional methods becomes available. When
the categorical method is adopted, the threshold inquiry and the
broader question become one: constitutional implication signifies constitutional protection. Scalia's opinion in Smith, considered in the
previous Section, illustrates this circumstance. Under a pure version
of this approach, government interests should never come into play at
all. Obviously, this is rarely, if ever, the case.
a. Defining "Liberty" and "Property"
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits any state from depriving a
'8 7
person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
This provision requires the Court initially to define the terms "life,"
"liberty," and "property" before determining what "process" is
"due."" 8 The categorization process assumes great importance,
because the Court reviews only those deprivations having constitutional stature.
In Paul v. Davis, 9 respondent brought an action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 claiming that he was defamed by a flyer distributed by the
local police department that identified him as an "'active shoplifter.' "90 The respondent had been arrested but never tried for shoplifting. He claimed that the police's action injured his reputation and
thus deprived him of some "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 91 Under § 1983, respondent "had to show that [the
'92
police] had deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution.
87

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

88 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972) ("[The Court must] determine

whether due process requirements apply in the first place. . .
89 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
90 Id. at 697.
91 Id.
92 Id.

at 696-97. Section 1983 also requires that the deprivation be under color of law. This
element of § 1983 was not in dispute. Id. at 697 n.2.
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The initial query thus concerned whether the concept of "liberty"
encompasses reputation. The Court concluded that it did not.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, writing for the Court, asked
whether the Due Process Clause "should ex proprio vigore extend...

a right to be free of injury wherever the State may be characterized as
the tortfeasor."9 3 If so, Rehnquist observed, it "would make of the

Fourteenth Amendment a font of tort law to be superimposed... by
the States."' 94 This construction would produce untenable consequences: "Respondent's construction would seem almost necessarily
to result in every legally cognizable [state inflicted] injury ...

estab-

lishing a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." 95 Rehnquist's
analysis confuses the construction of "liberty" with the potential consequences following from that construction. 96 Finding the Due Pro-

cess Clause to be implicated does not mean it is necessarily violated.
The ultimate constitutional query is not whether liberty has been
deprived, but whether it has been deprived without due process.9 7
Defining "liberty" in Paul effectively became an exercise in limiting

the consequences flowing from any particular definition employed.
Rather than balance the consequences of extending the liberty right
against the magnitude of that right, the Court narrowed the definition
of liberty on account of these consequences. Professor Henry P.

Monaghan explained the point well: "[T]he pressure to keep these
93 Id. at 701.
94 Id.

95 Id. at 699. See also Henry P. Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 Cornell L.
Rev. 405, 427 (1977) (commenting that Rehnquist's argument "seems to assume that the
tortious character of the state official's conduct, if proved, would of necessity establish a
constitutional violation").
96 Justice Brennan, writing in dissent noted the confusion:
[The Court] simply fails to recognize the crucial difference between the question
whether there is a personal interest in one's good name and reputation that is
constitutionally cognizable as a "liberty" or "property" interest ... and the totally
separate question whether particular government action with respect to that interest
satisfies the mandates of due process.
Paul, 424 U.S. at 727-28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97 Chief Justice Rehnquist has exhibited his understanding of this distinction in other
contexts. In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327 (1986), a prisoner brought a § 1983 action for the negligent deprivation of a hobby set
worth $23.50. Id. at 529. Rehnquist conceded that the hobby set was property and had been
deprived but explained that these issues were only the start of the constitutional question:
"Nothing in [the Fourteenth] Amendment protects against all deprivations of life, liberty, or
property by the State. [The Amendment] protects only against deprivations 'without due
process of law.'" Id. at 537 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979)).
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cases out of the federal courts was great, and so a compromise was
struck. Rather than facing the balancing question at the merits stage,
the Court struck a compromise at the definitional stage."98 The

Court did not entirely fail to consider the empirical consequences of
an expanded liberty right, therefore, it simply moved this application
query to the definition prong.
In addition to transplanting into the definition prong the "dire"
consequences of making the Fourteenth Amendment "a font of tort
law," Rehnquist invoked state law to give content to the liberty category: "[I]nterests attain this constitutional status by virtue of the fact
that they have been initially recognized and protected by state law
.. . .99
Similarly, and indeed more prominently, the Court has
explicitly given state law constitutional dimensions in the context of
defining "property." Justice John Paul Stevens expressed this position unambiguously in Bishop v. Wood: ° "[T]he sufficiency of the
claim of entitlement must be decided by reference to state law....
Whether such a guarantee has been given can be determined only by
an examination of the particular statute or ordinance in question."' 01
The Court's argument that the constitutional categories of "liberty" and "property" should be coterminous with state law definitions
rests on governmental and institutional concerns, rather than traditional constitutional authorities. In Paul, Rehnquist largely ignored
the historical content of the "liberty" component of due process. 02
In its property cases, the Court fails to explain the constitutional principle that limits due process to state-defined property in a satisfactory
way. Without question, property rights typically flow from "existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as
state law,"' 10 3 but this argument overstates the point. As other commentators have observed, certain interests deserve constitutional pro98 Monaghan, supra note 95, at 429.
99 Paul, 424 U.S. at 710. For a different rationale for Paulthan the one Rehnquist offers,
see Rodney A. Smolla, The Displacement of Federal Due Process Claims by State Tort
Remedies, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 831, 846-47 ("The result [in Paul] ...was not justified by the
reason Justice Rehnquist gave-that Kentucky law did not extend its protection to Mr. Davis'

reputation-but by precisely the opposite fact: because Kentucky law did protect Davis,

Kentucky did nothing to violate the due process clause." (emphasis omitted)).
100 426 U.S. 341 (1976).

101Id. at 344-45 (footnote omitted).
102 See Monaghan, supra note 95, at 427.
103 Bishop, 426 U.S. at 344 n.7.
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tection as property regardless of the state's definition. 1°4 The Court's
reliance on the state's discretion eviscerates the essential Madisonian
principle that the majority should not define the limits of its own powers. The Due Process Clause restrains majority tyranny of liberty and
property, then, only at the sufferance of the majority. Thus constituted, the clause stands as a frail bulwark against tyrannical winds.
b. Defining "Cruel and UnusualPunishment"
The Eighth Amendment forbids state imposition of cruel and unusual punishments. Yet, the Court has never found the death penalty
itself to be cruel and unusual.10 Instead, the Court scrutinizes state
death penalty schemes to ensure that an otherwise constitutional penalty is not imposed in an unconstitutional manner. Because the death
penalty does not fall within the purview of the Eighth Amendment,
however, this scrutiny is deferential to the legislative will.106 Put differently, the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the arbitrariness or capriciousness of a particular capital sentencing scheme in
order to prove that the Constitution is implicated.
The Eighth Amendment inquiry represents the mirror image of due
process described in the previous Section. In the liberty/property
context, the challenger's inability to get into the category means the
Court will not substantively review the strength of the government's
interests; the government's action will be sustained. In the Eighth
Amendment context, if the punishment is found to be cruel and unusual no state justification would save it; the government's action will
be invalidated. In both the due process and the Eighth Amendment
contexts, therefore, the Court uses government interests at the definition stage to narrow the scope of the respective right. In due process
cases, this strategy operates to keep the challenger out of court and in
Eighth Amendment cases it operates to keep the government in court.
The definition prong of Eighth Amendment analysis presents the
Court with special difficulty. The amendment's direction that "cruel
and unusual punishments" are forbidden provides little illumination
regarding the specific punishments that do not pass constitutional
104 See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 95, at 435 (drawing a distinction between interests,
which are generally dependent upon state law, and the characterizationof those interests as
"property").
105 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
106

Id. at 175.
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muster. History, in the form of original intent, has been especially
unhelpful in clarifying acceptable modes of punishment. Many punishments regularly practiced at the time of the framing of the Eighth

Amendment are not tolerated today.10 7 More than any other amendment, perhaps, construction of the Eighth Amendment has depended

on modem sensibilities and, not surprisingly, the government's reasons for imposing the death penalty.
The constitutionality of capital punishment rests on two arguments,
retribution and deterrence.108 Both of these bases represent the government purposes underlying capital punishment statutes. They are
advanced by the Court, however, not to justify capital punishment
under the Eighth Amendment, but instead to fix the meaning of
"cruel and unusual." 10 9

Retribution is often assumed to be sufficient to sustain capital punishment on its face. But the Court has buttressed its normative con-

clusion on the basis of two factual assumptions. First, the Court has
argued that the failure of the system to provide for "normal" impulses

would lead to increased vigilantism. 110 Secondly, the Court has relied

107See, e.g., In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) ("Punishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death."); Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) ("[I]t is safe
to affirm that punishments of torture ...are forbidden by that amendment."). See generally
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (The Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.");
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (The scope of cruel and unusual
punishments "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice.").
108Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183-87; id. at 233 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The two purposes that
sustain the death penalty as nonexcessive in the Court's view are general deterrence and
retribution.").
109Yet, the Eighth Amendment arguably differs from other constitutional contexts in that it
appears to itself incorporate government interest analysis into the definition of the right. This
conclusion has been rejected by other commentators, see, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at
88 n.200, and would permit, if taken to its logical conclusion, evisceration of the right through
sufficient majoritarian action. See infra note 114 and accompanying text. It is not difficult to
imagine defining "cruel and unusual" by resort to contemporary community values without
relying on government interests. For instance, scientific surveys of voters might be preferred
over a survey of state statutes. See infra note 113. The substantive content of the Eighth
Amendment is beyond the scope of this Article. To be sure, however, insofar as specific
constitutional provisions themselves incorporate government interests in their definitions, the
Court can legitimately rely on these factors at the definitional stage.
110Concerned with the possibility that without capital punishment the public might turn to
self-help, the Court observed:
The instinct for retribution is part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in
the administration of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the
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on contemporary values, finding support for the retributive impulse of
the general public in state legislation overwhelmingly sanctioning the

death penalty.
Virtually any degree of scrutiny of the empirical foundation for the

Court's retribution rationale would reveal the paucity of evidence for
it. Foremost, neither empirical research nor common sense supports
the view that the public will form lynch mobs when convicted murderers receive life imprisonment instead of death.11 x On the other

hand, the public's support of the death penalty-as a measure of the
retributive impulse-is a more complex issue. The Court has consistently used state legislation as its measure of the public view. 1 2 This
measure is troubling on at least two accounts. First, it is, at best, only
a rough approximation of the general public's views. Opinion polls

indicate a lack of consensus on the "cruelty" of the death penalty,
especially in difficult cases in which most state legislation still authorizes it. 113 Second, logic does not recommend the use of state statutes
authorizing capital punishment to ascertain the meaning of "cruel and

stability of a society governed by law. When people begin to believe that organized
society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they
'deserve,' then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilante justice, and
lynch law.
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
IIISee Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 303 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("There is no
evidence whatever that utilization of imprisonment rather than death encourages private blood
feuds and other disorders.").
112 The Court has also sometimes referred to the decisions of sentencing juries as a measure
of public sentiment. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 (1988) (plurality
opinion); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 794-96 (1982).
113 Although, according to a 1988 Gallup Poll, 79% of respondents supported the death
penalty for persons convicted of murder, George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion
1988 at 250 (1989), this percentage drops significantly when examined more closely. In a 1986
Gallup Poll, for instance, 70% supported the death penalty for convicted murderers, but only
55% did so when offered the alternative of life imprisonment without parole. George H.
Gallup, Jr., The Death Penalty, Gallup Reports, Jan.-Feb. 1986, at 10-16. Additionally, polls
consistently indicate lack of support for imposing the death penalty when the defendant is
mentally retarded. See Advocates Want Mentally Retarded Protected From Death Penalty,
Proprietary to the U.P.I., Feb. 2, 1989, Regional News (mentioning a University of Maryland
study indicating that whereas 67% of respondents favored the death penalty for those
convicted of murder, 82% did not support it for mentally retarded convicts); Groups Urge
Abolition of Death Penalty, Proprietary to the U.P.I., Jan. 9, 1989, Regional News; Stephen
Chapman, Do We Have a Right to Execute a Child in a Man's Body?, Chi. Trib., Jan. 15,
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unusual" 4in order to test the constitutionality of those very same
11
statutes.
Deterrence, the alternative justification for the death penalty, and
the justification more explicitly empirically based, has been the subject
of especially heated debate. The Court first visited the issue of the
death penalty's deterrent effect in Furman v. Georgia,l"' but like the
researchers in the area, could reach no consensus. The Court revisited this intractable question in Gregg v. Georgia,116 again reaching no
consensus other than concluding that the issue did not fall within its
job description: "The value of capital punishment as a deterrent of
crime is a complex factual issue the resolution of which properly rests
with the legislatures, which can evaluate the results of statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of
'
approach that is not available to the courts." 117
McCleskey v. Kemp 118 represents a remarkable, and regrettable,
example of deference to the legislative will even in the face of actual
evidence of arbitrary and capricious imposition of capital punishment.
Justice Lewis F. Powell, writing for the Court, accepted the validity of
an empirical study conducted by David Baldus and others (the
"Baldus study") that indicated that "defendants charged with killing
white victims were 4.3 times as likely to receive a death sentence as
defendants charged with killing blacks."' 1 9 Rather than evaluating

this evidence himself, however, Powell referred these troubling statis-

1989, at C36 (reporting a Louis Harris Poll indicating that 70% of those surveyed opposed the
death penalty for the mentally retarded).
Interestingly, in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334-35 (1989), Justice O'Connor, writing
for the Court, dismissed the value of opinion pQlls as being insufficiently objective to assist in
resolving the constitutionality of imposing the death penalty on the mentally retarded. She
relied instead on the "objective" data provided by state statutes, a majority of which permit the

imposition of the death penalty for the mentally retarded. O'Connor never explained why
state statutes are objective and opinion polls are not, on the issue of public attitudes regarding

the death penalty.
114See Ely, supra note 10, at 69 ("[I]t makes no sense to employ the value judgments of the
majority as the vehicle for protecting minorities from the value judgments of the majority.").
15 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
116 428 U.S. 153 (1976).

117Id. at 186.
118 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
"19 Id. at 287.
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tics to the legislatures to contemplate. 120 The government's reasons
for imposing the death penalty kept the death penalty safe from constitutional objection except in narrowly defined circumstances. Those
circumstances then proved to be effectively unmeetable, because in
making that final determination the Court further deferred to the legislative judgment. Instead, the responsibility for examining statesponsored discrimination was left to the state.
Gregg's categorization of the death penalty as not "cruel and unusual" dictated the deferential posture the Court adopted toward the
state's death penalty scheme in McCleskey. The dynamic between
these two cases deserves to be highlighted. The original categorization in Gregg was informed by a government interests analysis that
placed the burden on the challenger to refute the twin arguments of
retribution and deterrence. Although this placement at first seems
natural because the challenger traditionally bears the burden of persuasion at the definition stage, closer scrutiny reveals its violation of
Madisonian premises. Moreover, this violation led to the deferential
review of the scheme in McCleskey. Consequently, in Eighth Amendment cases, the Court actually counts the government interests twice,
most egregiously in defining the right, and then, compounding the
error, when examining specific allegations of infringements of the
diluted right. In many respects, the double-counting evident in
McCleskey distinguishes the Eighth Amendment context from the
other categorical cases reviewed above in that in those cases, the categorization ended the analysis with the government prevailing at the
definition stage. In the Eighth Amendment, the government interests
serve double duty, initially diluting the right at the definition stage in
order to keep the government in Court long enough for it to prevail at
the application stage.
2. DefinitionalBalancing: Defining Speech
Definitional balancing is the preeminent constitutional method
practiced today.12 Despite its substantial use, the parameters of definitional balancing remain somewhat obscure. Of course, initially,
120Id. at 319 ("Legislatures ... are better qualified to weigh and 'evaluate the results of
statistical studies in terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that
is not available to the courts.' ") (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 186).
121Aleinikoff, supra note 43, at 943-44. See id. at 944 n.4 for a list of sources debating the

wisdom of this balancing.
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some constitutional right must be implicated before the Court can
review the government action. As the metaphor suggests, the reviewing Court sets the right implicated on one scale and the government
reasons for restricting that right on the other. The weightier privilege
prevails. The distinguishing feature of the definitional balance is that

it is struck at a macro level, with categories of cases being reviewed to
determine the requisite degree of constitutional protection. Balancing
appeals to the Madisonian structure of accommodation by seeming to
account for the rights and interests of both majority and individual;
the scales allow for the rational comparison of competing privileges.
In practice, however, the Court has been sloppy in separating the
ingredients to be weighed and in failing to clean the scales after each
use.
Perhaps the most fertile ground for debating categories in the Constitution is the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 122 The
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence is too broad a subject to be
covered comprehensively here. This part examines a discrete area of
First Amendment concern-obscenity and pornography. More than
most provisions of the Constitution, the practical consequences of
transposing the burden of persuasion from government to challenger
can be seen clearly in the First Amendment context.
The Free Speech Clause is deceptively simple and straightforward:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press." 123 Taken literally, the First Amendment extends absolute protection to all speech. Justice Hugo L. Black long advocated
this absolute or categorical interpretation of the First Amendment. 124
His strategy was "absolute," however, only in a narrow sense of that
term. Black extended absolute protection to all "speech," but what
constituted speech was a matter not susceptible to similarly absolute
parameters. In Street v. New York, 125 for example, a flag burning
case, Black dissented from the Court's invocation of the First Amend122See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three

Acts, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 265 (1981); Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to
Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 671 (1983).
123 U.S. Const. amend. I.
124 See, e.g., Hugo L. Black, A Constitutional Faith 45 (1968) ("I simply believe that
'Congress shall make no law' means Congress shall make no law."); Ducat, supra note 42, at
64-78; Harry Kalven, Jr., Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14
UCLA L. Rev. 428, 441-44 (1967).
125 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
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ment because the prosecution did not rest on spoken words: "The
talking that was done took place 'as an integral part of conduct.' ""26
In his view, conduct and the words attending that conduct did not
constitute "speech" despite their expressive content. 12 7 When conduct affected ideas, however, it was protected by a First Amendment
balancing process. 128 The tension created by adopting an absolute test
was reduced through the safety valve of a relativistic definition of
speech.
The Court has never subscribed to Black's First Amendment absolutist strategy. Although it has instead employed some form of definitional balancing 129 to reconcile the desires of majorities to regulate
speech with the rights of individuals to speak freely, one fact remains
clear: Though subject to being balanced, "speech" receives special
protection that "non-speech" does not. As Justice John M. Harlan
explained, throughout the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence,
"certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, has been considered outside the scope of constitutional protection." 1 30 The process of deciding what forms of speech and which contexts fall outside
the First Amendment illustrates well the reciprocity of definition and
application.
In Roth v. United States,1 31 the Court held that "obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."1 32 In
accordance with traditional principles, the Court initially based this
conclusion on the content of the First Amendment: "[I]mplicit in the

126 Id. at 610 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S.
490, 498 (1949)).
127 See also Black, supra note 123, at 54 ("Conduct" such as "[m]arching back and forth,
though utilized to communicate ideas, [was] not speech and therefore [was] not protected by
the First Amendment.").
128 See, e.g., Black, supra note 123, at 60-61 (restating that laws regulating conduct were
subject to First Amendment scrutiny "'by a balancing process, if they indirectly affect
ideas' ") (quoting Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 142 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting)).
129 The specific constitutional method employed in the Court's obscenity cases remains
difficult to specify, but most cases appear to fall into a definitional balancing mode.
130 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961); see also Schauer, supra note 3, at 905
("No matter what approach is taken, some definition of speech that will give the First
Amendment discrete application and meaning is required.").
131 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
132 Id. at 485.
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history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
'
without redeeming social importance." 133

[Thirteen] of the 14 States which by 1792 had ratified the Constitution ... provided for the prosecution of libel, and all of those States

made either blasphemy or profanity, or both, statutory crimes....
In light of this history, it is apparent that... obscenity, 134
[like libel],
was outside the protection intended for speech and press.
This historical argument, however, suffers many weaknesses. If it
alone supported exclusion of obscenity from First Amendment protection, profanity and blasphemy too should be excluded. But the
Court has not, and is not likely to, read this history so conclusively.1 35
Yet, the Roth Court offered no additional constitutional authority and
no elaboration of its definition of speech to support its exclusion of
obscenity from coverage. Instead, the Court defined "speech"
through balancing: "[Obscene] utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them' 136
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."
The exact relevance of the "social interest in order and morality" in
First Amendment obscenity analysis remains obscure. This argument
seems to have little significance to any definition of speech, yet it also
seems to be used to narrow "speech" so as not to extend it to
"obscene speech." The Roth Court weighed the social interest against
the First Amendment principle, yet there is no First Amendment
principle implicated if obscenity is not speech. If the First Amendment fails to encompass obscenity, the Court has no business reviewing the basis for the government's action. If obscenity is "speech,"
the Court should not accept uncritically the social interest at stake.
The Court, in fact, advanced the "social interest in order and moral133 Id. at 484.

Id. at 482-83.
Professor Kalven made this point when he asked rhetorically, "Is it clear, for example,
that blasphemy can constitutionally be made a crime today? And what would the Court say to
an argument along the same lines appealing to the Sedition Act of 1798 as justification for the
truly liberty-defeating crime of seditious libel?" Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the
Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 9. As for Kalven's query regarding seditious libel, the
Court has answered it in the negative. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964).
136 Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
134
135
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ity" to define speech. By "defining" obscenity out of the category of
speech, the Court avoided having to review closely the factual basis
for state regulation in this area. 137 As we will see, moreover, this factual basis is particularly troubling in the area of obscenity.
Underlying modem obscenity doctrine, and the basis for most state
regulations, is concern over the effect obscene material has on those
reading or viewing it. 13 1 Social scientists have long studied and
debated the effects of obscenity and pornographic materials on view-

ers and can be expected to continue examining this issue for some
time to come.1 39 As two national commissions have discovered, the
empirical uncertainties in this area are overwhelming. 140 The present

concern is not the proper resolution to this debate, however, but
rather the Court's treatment of the debate itself. Lacking a consensus
regarding the societal effects of obscenity, the party bearing the bur-

den of persuasion inevitably loses. 14 1 The result of the Court's First
137 The Roth Court understood the practical effect of its adjudicatory method:
It is insisted that the constitutional guaranties are violated because convictions may be
had without proof either that obscene material will perceptibly create a clear and
present danger of antisocial conduct, or will probably induce its recipients to such
conduct. But, in light of our holding that obscenity is not protected speech, the
complete answer to this argument is ... [that] "it is unnecessary ...

for us ... to

consider the issues behind the phrase 'clear and present danger."'
354 U.S. at 486 (quoting Beauharnais v. Illnois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952)) (footnotes omitted).
138See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973) ("[Ihere is at least an
arguable correlation between obscene material and crime.").
139 For good comprehensive reviews of the research on the effects of pornography, see
Edward Donnerstein, Daniel Linz & Steven Penrod, The Question of Pornography: Research
Findings and Policy Implications (1987); Pornography and Sexual Aggression (Neil M.
Malamuth & Edward Donnerstein eds., 1984).
140 Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, Report (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Report];
Attorney Gen.'s Comm'n on Pornography, Final Report (1986) [hereinafter Attorney
General's Report]. The Attorney General's Report, though recognizing ambiguities in the
research, believed the data to be sufficient to support government regulation of most kinds of
obscenity and pornography. Attorney General's Report, supra, at 322-51. The Commission's
methods and conclusions, however, have been subjected to trenchant criticism. See Daniel
Linz, Steven D. Penrod & Edward Donnerstein, The Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography: The Gaps Between "Findings" and Facts, 1987 Am. B. Found. Res. J.713;
Richards, supra note 25.
141Professor Richards observed that the Attorney General's Report proceeded upon the
questionable assumption that the burden lies upon the challenger of state regulations: "[U]nder
the Commission's theory of burden of proof, only some small amount of evidence of causal
significance is required for the state to continue exercising state power in attacking harms,
whereas a strong case of no harms is required to justify publication." Richards, supra note 25,
at 305. But see Attorney General's Report, supra note 139, at 306-09 (discussing the difficulty
of establishing the appropriate standard). The Commission's allocation of burdens is not
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Amendment jurisprudence has been to place the burden squarely on
the challenger of state action.
ParisAdult Theater I v. Slaton 142 illustrates well the deference the
Court pays to the government's interest in the social and moral order
by classifying obscenity as other than speech: "It is not for us to
resolve empirical uncertainties underlying state legislation, save in the
exceptional case where that legislation plainly impinges upon rights
protected by the Constitution itself."1 4 But the very conclusion that
obscene speech is not an "exceptional case" protected by the Constitution hinges on the "empirical uncertainties" underlying the state
legislation. The great ambiguity infecting this area and the extraordinary difficulty in researching these issues means that the state would
have considerable difficulty demonstrating the relationship between
obscenity and any specific social ills if required to do so. The government's task, therefore, is made lighter: "The sum of experience...
affords an ample basis for legislatures to conclude that a sensitive, key
relationship of human existence, central to family life, community
welfare, and the development of human personality, can be debased
and distorted by crass commercial exploitation of sex." 144 In determining that the First Amendment does not extend to obscenity, the
Court defers to anecdotal experience to uphold the basis for the state's
action. In marked contrast, when regulations fall within the core of
the First Amendment, the state ordinarily bears a substantial burden
of justifying its interference with that right. In the context of obscenity, the Court avoids placing this unbearable empirical burden on the
state by employing these very same "empirical uncertainties" to categorize obscenity as nonspeech. This, of course, has the effect of shifting the obligation to resolve these uncertainties onto the challenger of
the state action.
The Court's recent decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatre,Inc. 145 illustrates the danger created by the Court's definition of "speech." In
Glen Theatre, petitioner challenged an Indiana law barring public
questionable in regard to obscenity in light of Roth and ParisAdult Theater I; however, the
Commission's conclusions extended well beyond obscenity to include pornography-materials
receiving First Amendment protection. See id. at 299-302.
142 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
143 Id. at 60.
144 Id. at 63.
145 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (plurality opinion).
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nudity as applied to nude dancing in the petitioner's club. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined only by Justice O'Connor and Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy, found that "nude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of 'the

First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so. "146
Rehnquist did not explain his narrow interpretation of speech on the
basis of First Amendment principles. He, instead, enlisted government purposes to fix the appropriate level of protection for this form
of speech: "[W]hen 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined

in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." 147 This "sufficiently important governmental interest," it turns out, was the "authority to
provide for the public health, safety, and morals"-precisely the same
justification given for regulating obscenity in Roth. 148 Rehnquist
applied in theory an intermediate level of scrutiny-that the government interest must be "important or substantial"-but applied in fact
the same minimal standard employed when the First Amendment is
not implicated.149

In effect, Glen Theatre, in which the First Amendment was implicated, was indistinguishable from the Court's obscenity cases, in
which the First Amendment was deemed not to be implicated.15" The
146 Id. at 2460 (plurality opinion).
147 Id. at 2461 (plurality opinion).
148 Id. at 2462 (plurality opinion).
149 Justice Scalia, concurring, was more explicit about the absence of First Amendment
protection in the nude dancing context on the basis that "the challenged regulation... [is] a
general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at expression." Id. at 2463 (Scalia,
J., concurring). Scalia advanced the same government interests argument used in Smith to
define the parameters of the Free Exercise Clause: "'The government's ability to enforce
generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other
aspects of public policy, "cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on
a religious objector's spiritual development .... Id. at 2467 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1603
(1990) (quoting Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451
(1988))).
150 Justice Scalia came to the same conclusion:
It cannot reasonably be demanded.., that every restriction of expression incidentally
produced by a general law regulating conduct pass normal First-Amendment scrutiny,
or even-as some of our cases have suggested-that it be justified by an 'important or
substantial' government interest. Nor do our holdings require such justification: we
have never invalidated the application of a general law simply because the conduct that
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facile transference of government interests from the application prong
to the definition prong made this result possible. Nude dancing,
Rehnquist conceded, constituted "speech," so the pertinent inquiry
involved the application of that interpretation to the government's
interests. Because the "social interest in order and morality" served
in the early cases to define obscenity as nonspeech, this government
purpose could be employed by Rehnquist in Glen Theatre both to narrow the definition of the right (i.e., placing nude dancing at the "margins" of speech) and, in addition, to outweigh expression that was
speech. Rehnquist thus double counted the government interest in
social order and morality in Glen Theatre.
Justice David H. Souter, in contrast, recognized the need to add
factors to the government's side of the scales if the government's
interests were to now outweigh an infringed right. Agreeing that the
nude dancing at issue was expressive conduct deserving of First
Amendment coverage, Souter wrote separately to supply an additional basis for the regulation beyond "society's moral views": "[T]he
statute is applied to nude dancing because such dancing 'encourag[es]
prostitution, increas[es] sexual assaults, and attract[s] other criminal
activity.' "151 Although the majority's moral desires might outweigh
obscenity, standing alone they could not outweigh "speech," however
far out on the perimeter of the First Amendment it might be situated.152 Although the actual burden Souter placed on the government
was quite slight,153 his opinion, like Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Smith, is faithful to Madisonian premises, and thus does not contain
the potential for harm inherent in Rehnquist's opinion.
it reached was being engaged in for expressive purposes and the government could not
demonstrate a sufficiently important state interest.
Id. at 2466 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
151 Id. at 2469 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for Petitioners 37).
152

Justice Harlan put it this way: "[Tihe mere assertion that the action of the State finds

justification in the controversial realm of morals cannot justify alone any and every restriction
it imposes." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 545 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
153

In concluding that the government's interest was important or substantial, Souter

deferred to the state's empirical judgment. Souter explained that, just as in Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), the state
[is] not compelled to justify its restrictions by studies specifically relating to the
problems that would be caused by adult theaters in that city. Rather, "[the city] was
entitled to rely on the experiences of... other cities" which demonstrated the harmful

secondary effects correlated with the presence "of even one [adult] theater in a given
neighborhood."
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3. Multitiered Balancing Tests
Multitiered tests theoretically sit very near definitional balancing
on the spectrum of constitutional methods. Definitional balancing
informs the construction of the individual right, but this result, rather
than being applied inexorably like the definitional balance, is balanced
once again in a quasi-ad hoc fashion. All of this balancing makes the
reader, and apparently the Court too, quite dizzy.
a. The Equal Protection Clause
In many respects, the Equal Protection Clause is the exemplar of
the meeting of interpretation and application in constitutional adjudication. 15 4 For this reason, it embodies many of the attendant complications that this juncture has engendered. Court decisions and
scholarly commentary in this domain are especially solicitous of the
principles behind the shifting burdens of persuasion inherent in the
constitutional structure. 155 Because of concern over regressing into
the Lochnerian bog, equal protection jurisprudence-the last bastion
of substantive rights protection 15--is sensitive to the majoritarian
foundations of the system. Still, in a wide variety of areas, the Court
has not shied away from subjecting the actions of the political
branches to close scrutiny when core rights were at risk. Identifying
the parameters of the Equal Protection Clause's core, however, has
proved difficult, leading the Court to borrow elements of the application prong for assistance.
In Graham v. Richardson, 57 the Court interpreted the Equal Protection Clause to extend to aliens, finding them to be a " 'discrete and
Glen Theatre, 111 S.Ct. at 2469 (Souter, J.,
concurring) (third alteration in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1986)).
Souter thus required the state to articulate the harmful secondary effects that served as the
basis for its regulation of nude dancing but left the burden for introducing research to refute
this empirical claim to the challenger of state action. Heightened scrutiny for Souter
amounted to a heightened pleading requirement.
154 See generally Monahan & Walker, supra note 15, at 581-82 (focusing on judicial review
under the Equal Protection Clause to "illustrate how courts should deal with unanswered
empirical questions" in constitutional interpretation generally).
155See, e.g., id. at 582-89.
156 See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1087, 1089-91

(1982).
157

403 U.S. 365 (1971).
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insular' minority."158 Under this interpretation, laws singling out
aliens for unfavorable treatment were "subject to strict judicial scru'
tiny."159
In Graham and subsequent cases, the Court applied strict
scrutiny to invalidate laws discriminating against aliens in regard to
receiving welfare benefits," 6° employment in the civil service, 161 state
bar certification,1 62 employment as a civil engineer,16 3 and financial
assistance for higher education.14 In each of these cases, the asserted
government purpose for classifying aliens 1for
discriminatory treat65
review.
scrutiny
strict
under
withered
ment
In Foley v. Connelie,1 66 however, the Court qualified its interpretation of the protection accorded aliens.1 67 The Foley Court upheld a
New York law that excluded aliens from public employment as state
troopers, on the grounds that those positions involved the establishment and exercise of broad public policy.1 6 But the Court did not
scrutinize the law strictly either to determine whether this was in fact
true, or if it was, to determine if that fact created a compelling interest
in excluding aliens sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny review.
Instead, the Court carved an exception to the compelling interest test
for "those 'important nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial
positions,' held by 'officers who participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy.' 1169 The basis for

this exception, and in fact the rationale for the New York law, was the
citizenry's desire to "be governed by their citizen peers. ' 170 The right
of aliens as a class to receive equal protection of the laws was thus
158 Id.

at 372.

159Id. at 376. See generally supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (introducing the

three tiers of equal protection scrutiny and the types of interest which generally trigger each
tier).
160Graham, 403 U.S. 365.
161 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
162 In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
163 Examining Bd. of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572
(1976).
164Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977).
165 See Elizabeth Hull, Resident Aliens and the Equal Protection Clause: The Burger
Court's Retreat from Graham v. Richardson, 47 Brook. L. Rev. 1 (1980).
166 435 U.S. 291 (1978).

167 This change in direction was anticipated in dicta in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634,
647 (1973). See Hull, supra note 164, at 15.
168 Foley, 435 U.S. at 293.

169 Id. at 296 (quoting Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647).
170 Id.
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narrowed by the competing government interest in excluding noncitizens from political positions. After Foley, the remnants of the equal
protection right, previously recognized as a core value mandating
strict scrutiny, accorded aliens merely rational
basis review of the
1 71
government's purposes in particular contexts.
The government interest in the political function might indeed be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh aliens' rights under the Equal Protection Clause, but the Court never reached this conclusion. The
Court never examined the effect of alien inclusion on the political
function; nor did it scrutinize the public's expressed desire to exclude
aliens from the political function. It simply shifted the burden to the
alien to demonstrate the irrational basis for excluding aliens from cer172
tain occupations, or for classifying those occupations as "political."
Moreover, the Court never examined, and itself seemed to assume,
what Justice Stevens called the aliens' "unarticulated characteristic,' 1 73 that they are less loyal than citizens. Although the Court
might have reached the same result applying strict scrutiny, such
analysis would have placed a real burden on the state to prove, rather
than assume, its case.
Alternatively, perhaps a "correct" interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause does not prescribe a "compelling interest" test when
the rights of aliens are implicated. The Court, however, never reconsidered the "constitutional" meaning of the clause. Instead, the rights
created by that clause became less "fundamental" by virtue of the
importance of the government's concerns in the political function
context. The Court removed any burden from the state to explain its
reasons for discriminating against aliens by employing those very reasons to define the right at stake.
171Id. ("The State need only justify its classification by a showing of some rational
relationship between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting classification.").
172As the separate dissents make clear, finding police officers to qualify within the newly
created political function category could pass muster only under the most minimal review. See
id. at 304-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The officer responding to a particular situation is only
applying the basic policy choices-which he has no role in shaping-to the facts as he
perceives them."); Id. at 310 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Respect for the law enforcement
profession and its essential function, like respect for the military, should not cause us to lose
sight of the fact that in our representative democracy neither the constabulary nor the military
is vested with broad polieymaking responsibility.").
173 Id. at 312 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Hull, supra note 164, at 21 (finding Justice
Stevens' focus on the "unarticulated characteristic" correct).
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The Due Process Clause
In Roe v. Wade, 174 the Court found that "[the constitutional] right

of privacy . . .is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision

whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."' 175 This fundamental
right has since been firmly located in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Roe
Court, held that the Texas law prohibiting abortion could be upheld
only if it served a compelling state interest. 176 The identified right was
supported by a variety of arguments, including especially the social
and psychological effects of an unwanted pregnancy on a woman.1 77

Since Roe, the right has been redescribed in several ways,
and the
178
fundamental nature of the right is today in serious doubt.
Although the "essential holding" of Roe was reaffirmed by a majority of the Court just last term in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 179 the
statement of the law has changed significantly since 1973. Originally,
Roe identified the decision to terminate a pregnancy as a fundamental
right and subjected state laws limiting that right to the most exacting
scrutiny of the compelling interests test. 180 Under this test, the state
assumes the burden of justifying any infringements of the right. Since
Roe, members of the Court have advanced several substantial modifications both of the right to privacy, and its attendant level of scrutiny.
Only one Justice continues to subscribe to Roe in all its particulars-Justice Blackmun, its author.18 Four Justices question the
foundation of Roe itself and deny that the right to an abortion is fun174410 U.S. 113 (1973).
175Id. at 153.
176Id. at 155.
177 Id. at 153.

178 See generally Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, Beyond the Roe Debate: Judicial

Experience with the 1980's "Reasonableness" Test, 76 Va. L. Rev. 519, 533-34 (1990)
(exploring alternative interpretations of Roe); Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International
Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed

Synthesis, 41 Hastings L.J. 805, 871-72 (1990) (exploring the use of international human rights
principles in our democratic legal process).
179112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).

18oRoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); see also Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983) (citing Roe), overruled by Casey, 112 S.Ct.
2791.
181 Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2844 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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damental.I82 Four Justices, and two different approaches to the issue,
occupy the broad middle ground between a "fundamental right" and

no right. Justice Stevens has consistently scrutinized abortion regulations closely but does not embrace fully the strictures of Roe. 18 3 The
second approach occupying the middle ground, one long advanced by

Justice O'Connor, protects a woman from state laws that
"unduly
184
burden" the decision whether to terminate a pregnancy.
In somewhat modified form, O'Connor's undue burden test became
the operative analysis in abortion cases with Justices Kennedy's and
Souter's embrace of it in Casey. In a rare joint opinion, Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter held that when a "state regulation
imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to [procure an abortion] ... the power of the State reach[es] into the heart of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause."' 8 5 The level of review the

undue burden test requires, however, remains unclear. According to
the joint opinion, "[a] finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for
the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
of a nonviable fetus."' 1 6 This strongly empirical test results from a
compromise struck at the definition stage of analysis between a

woman's right to an abortion and the government's interests in mater182 Justice White, Justice Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist in rejecting Roe:
We think.., both in view of this history and of our decided cases dealing with
substantive liberty under the Due Process Clause, that the Court was mistaken in Roe
when it classified a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy as a "fundamental
right" that could be abridged only in a manner which withstood "strict scrutiny."
Id. at 2860 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2944 (1990) (upholding a 48-hour
delay of a minor's abortion decision because "there is no evidence that the 48-hour period itself
is unreasonable"). In the abortion context, Justice Stevens adopts a relatively light standard of
review but puts the burden on the state to demonstrate a rational basis for its regulation. In
Hodgson, for example, he stated:
Because the Minnesota statute unquestionably places obstacles in the pregnant minor's
path to an abortion, the State has the burden of establishing its constitutionality. Under
any analysis, the Minnesota statute cannot be sustained if the obstacles it imposes are
not reasonably related to legitimate state interests.
Id. at 2937. Arguably, in abortion cases, Stevens has put teeth into the rational basis test.
184Id. at 2949-50 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 530 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment); Akron, 462 U.S. at 453 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
185 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2819 (plurality opinion).
186Id. at 2820 (plurality opinion).
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nal health and the life of the fetus. As a result of this definitional
compromise, analysis at the application stage has proved to be difficult. Before examining the application of the test, however, it is
instructive to examine its definitional origins.
In Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health, her most expansive discussion of the undue burden test prior to Casey, O'Connor
disparaged application of a compelling interest test in the abortion
context: "'[A] test so severe that legislation rarely can meet it should
be imposed by courts with deliberate restraint in view of the respect
that properly should be accorded legislative judgments.' "187 This
statement miscomprehends the essence of traditional fundamental
rights analysis, for when legislative action infringes a fundamental
right, the Court is obliged to scrutinize strictly the legislature's judgment.1 88 But according to O'Connor, the "nature and scope" of the
abortion right render it particularly appropriate for the "unduly burdensome" test.1 89 O'Connor, however, never explained why the
nature and scope of the right narrows the Court's scrutiny. Instead,
she rested her interpretation of the parameters of the right on the
gravity of the government's interests in maternal health and potential
life.'9 0 The undue burden test defines the right of reproductive choice
primarily in terms of the government's purposes in the matter.' 9 1 In
actuality, the right is diluted at the definition stage by the govern187 Akron, 462 U.S. at 463 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Carey
v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 705 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part)).

188See Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an
Audience of One, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 119, 124 (1989) ("Standard constitutional practice
requires applying strict scrutiny to government restrictions on fundamental rights.").
189
Akron, 462 U.S. at 463 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
190 Id. at 460 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
191Justice O'Connor would almost certainly object to this characterization of the unduly
burdensome test. Indeed, then-Solicitor General Rex E. Lee argued in Akron that the unduly
burdensome test should "accord heavy deference to the legislative judgment" of what
restrictions constitute "undue burdens." O'Connor disagreed:

The "unduly burdensome" standard is appropriate not because it incorporates deference
to legislative judgment at the threshold stage of analysis, but rather because of the
limited nature of the fundamental right that has been recognized in the abortion
cases.... [I]t is not appropriate to weigh the state interests at the threshold stage.

Id. at 465 n.10 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (discussing amicus curiae brief for
the United States). Despite O'Connor's description of her method, her opinion is devoid of
any constitutional authority that supports her argument that the nature of the privacy right is

less in abortion cases. The government interests might not be explicitly weighed at the threshold stage, but they significantly affect the categorization at that stage.
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ment's interests, not by any particular understanding of the right of
privacy in the abortion context. 192 In practice, this merger of rights
and interests has meant that no clear burden is allocated between the
parties to prove, or disprove, the fact that the regulation operates as a
"substantial obstacle" to the exercise of the right.
The recent decision in Casey illustrates well the ambiguity created
over which party bears the burden of proof on the factual (and normative) questions that inevitably arise under the undue burden test.
Among other provisions, the Pennsylvania law challenged in Casey
contained a 24-hour waiting period and a spousal notification requirement. 193 The joint opinion upheld the former and invalidated the latter, despite the findings of the district court below that both
provisions unconstitutionally interfered with the decision whether to
terminate a pregnancy. 194 The district court found that the 24-hour
waiting period increased the cost and risk of abortions, and was therefore "particularly burdensome."' 19 The joint opinion, however, concluded, "on the record before us... we are not convinced that the 24hour waiting period constitutes an undue burden."1 96 The 24-hour
waiting period, despite its particularlyburdensome nature, was not a
sufficiently substantial obstacle to be unduly burdensome. Apparently, the challengers bore, and failed to meet, the burden of persua-

sion on this matter. 97
192Dissenting in Hodgson, Justice Marshall well understood the sleight of hand that the
unduly burdensome test accomplished. Marshall argued that the right should be assessed
against the government interests, not diluted by those interests: "Neither the scope of a
woman's privacy right nor the magnitude of a law's burden is diminished because a woman is a
minor. Rather, a woman's minority status affects only the nature of the State's interests."
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2952 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
193The other three sections of the Act, all upheld by the Court, included an informed
consent provision, a provision requiring that minors obtain parental consent that also
contained a judicial bypass procedure, and certain reporting requirements for facilities
providing abortion services. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992).
194 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1396 (E.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2791
(1992).
195Id. at 1352.

196Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2826 (plurality opinion).
197The joint opinion also placed the burden of proof to show a "substantial obstacle" on the
challenger when it upheld the other three sections of the statute. In upholding the informed
consent provision, the joint opinion reasoned that there "is no evidence on this record that
[this requirement] ... would amount in practical terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman
seeking an abortion." Id. at 2824 (plurality opinion). Similarly, the joint opinion upheld the
reporting requirements, because "there is no ... showing on the record before us" that they
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In marked contrast, the Court adopted the factual findings of the
district court in striking down the spousal notification provision. The
Court listed an array of scholarly research it believed indicated that
"[t]he spousal notification requirement . . . does not merely make

abortions a little more difficult or expensive to obtain; for many
women, it will impose a substantial obstacle." 198 In fact, the Court
went beyond the findings of the district court and cited research not
contained in the record to support its conclusion. The joint opinion
leaves the distinct impression that the government bore the burden of
persuasion to demonstrate that spousal notification would not constitute a substantial obstacle. The government did not meet this burden.
The undue burden test leaves individual judges free to choose what
facts to accept or reject. In this respect, the undue burden test resembles ad hoe balancing, examined in the next Section. In ad hoc balancing cases, the balance is conducted in the application prong after a
determination that the Constitution is implicated. Although in theory
this approach might conform to Madisonian principles, 199 in practice,

the Court has found facts in these cases selectively. In Casey, the
joint opinion balanced government interests and the right of reproductive choice in the definition prong in order to frame a test that
leaves the Court still finding facts at their pleasure. Although prospective remedies might differ, the effect of the two approaches has
been the same. Justice Scalia lamented this muddled state of affairs:
[T]he approach of the joint opinion is, for the most part, simply to
highlight certain facts in the record that apparently strike the three
Justices as particularly significant in establishing (or refuting) the
constitute a "substantial obstacle" to abortion decisions. Id. at 2833 (plurality opinion).
Finally, the joint opinion summarily upheld the parental consent provision relying on
Hodgson. Id. at 2833 (plurality opinion). In Hodgson, Justice O'Connor found no evidence
demonstrating that the parental consent provisions, with a judicial bypass procedure, would
create an undue burden, despite the district court's conclusion to the contrary. Compare
Hodgson, 110 S. Ct. at 2951 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment
in part) with the district court opinion in Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 778 (D.
Minn. 1986), afrd, 827 F.2d 1191 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1102 (1987) (finding that
the two-parent notice requirement, even with the judicial bypass procedure, "affirmatively
discourages parent-child communication"). See also Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive
Health, 462 U.S. 416, 466 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting failure to introduce
evidence showing that a particular abortion restriction constituted an "undue burden"),
overruled by Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791.
198Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2829.
199See infra notes 228-32 and accompanying text.
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existence of an undue burden; after describing these facts, the opinion
then simply announces that the provision either does or does not
impose a "substantial obstacle" or an "undue burden.

'2 °

By jumbling the individual right and government interests at the
definition stage to create the undue burden test, the Court divests the
application prong of a guiding principle. For the Justices at the methodological poles of the Court, factual questions at the application
stage can be resolved straightforwardly because the definition stage
provides them with such a guide. Justice Blackmun, who believed the
right to be fundamental, found that the state did not come close to
meeting the compelling interest standard on the evidence available. 0 1
At the opposite pole, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice
White, Justice Scalia, and Justice Clarence Thomas, found the evidence available to be insufficient to conclude that the state had acted
irrationally.20 2 Although less straightforward, Justice Stevens' analysis makes clear that a middle position can be framed that establishes a
constitutional principle in the definition prong that guides even close
cases in the application prong.20 3 The disturbing feature in the joint
opinion's middle position is what Justice Scalia called its "rootless
nature. ' '204 In incorporating government interests in the definition of
the right, the joint opinion unearthed the right of reproductive choice
from the constitutional soil. It is not dead yet; but it desperately
needs tending.
4. Ad Hoc Balancing
Although typically thought of as a "shoot-from-the-hip" methodology, ad hoc balancing is rarely "ad hoc." In the many contexts in
which it is used, ad hoc balancing is guided by principles and precedent that limit the discretion of the balancing judge. Furthermore,
the ad hoc balance is triggered by, and thus is dependent upon, the
definition prong of constitutional adjudication.
Unlike the other constitutional methods, in practice ad hoc balancing does not misallocate the burden of persuasion-it simply ignores
it. By reducing adjudication to a constitutional calculus, the various
200 Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2880 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

201 Id. at 2853-54 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
202 Id. at 2867-73 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
203 Id. at 2840-41 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204 Id. at 2878 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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rights and interests are inserted into the Court's balancing formula,
with neither side bearing explicit responsibility for demonstrating the
relevant facts. The parties are equally responsible for arguing facts,
and ambiguity is not automatically resolved in favor of one party or
the other. Ambiguity, to the extent it is admitted, merely becomes a
part of the calculation.
a.

ProceduralDue Process

2 °5 stands as the paradigmatic ad hoe balancMathews v. Eldridge
0
6
In Mathews, the respondent claimed that due process
ing decision.
required an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefits.20 7 The state conceded
that a property interest was at risk and thus that the Due Process
Clause was implicated. The state argued, however, that due process
did not mandate an evidentiary hearing. The Court observed that
"'[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands.' "208 The Court then set forth the
three factors that must be balanced in each case:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.20 9

Although usually described as ad hoc, the Mathews balancing
formula is rarely applied in a truly ad hoe fashion. The Court uses
the test to resolve entire categories of cases rather than to reconcile
the conflicting interests in any particular case. In fact, in Mathews
itself, the Court did not consider how the discontinuance of disability
benefits would affect Eldridge.2 1 ° Instead, the Court applied the
Mathews test to the world of disability benefits. Mathews thus resembles definitional balancing, albeit at a narrower level of analysis than
205 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
206 See Aleinikoff, supra note 43, at 948.
207

424 U.S. at 325.

208

Id. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
Id. at 335.
See id. at 350 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

209

210
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the classic examples of definitional balancing. 2 1 Still, the general ad
hoc method differs considerably from the definitional method-as
well as all of the other methods-in important respects.
As noted, the Mathews balance is applied only after determining
that the Constitution has been infringed. The purpose of the threefactor balancing is to assess the government's justification for that
infringement. Yet, unlike the other constitutional methods already
examined, the Mathews test omits any semblance of situating burdens
of persuasion. A finding of constitutional infringement initiates the
process of review, but does not give rise to any presumptive outcome.
Instead, the test creates a sort of free for all, with the particular right
and several interests heaped upon an uncalibrated scale.212 Although
the sundry items may be separated for weighing purposes, the specific
identity of the parties, whether individual or state, matters very little.
The state's privilege is weighed equally with the individual's. The Bill
of Rights does not erect a bulwark against majority tyranny but,
rather, negotiates a settlement between opposing forces.
In Parham v. JR. ,213 for example, the Court held that the Constitution does not require a due process hearing when parents seek to "voluntarily commit" their children to state mental hospitals. Chief
Justice Warren E. Burger, writing for the Court, reached this result
by examining the individual and state interests set forth in Mathews.
Burger defined "privacy" to incorporate the child's liberty interest but
added that the right of privacy also extends to parents who historically have broad authority over minor children.214 The second interest concerned the risk of erroneously depriving the child of his liberty.
The third interest implicated the government's primary concern with
reducing the obstacles to hospital admission, in order to allow hospitals to carry out their mission and to avoid discouraging families from
using state mental health facilities.21 5
211 In other contexts, the Court does balance the interests in individual cases in an ad hoc

fashion. See, e.g., Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990) (calling for balancing the
psychological effects to the individual witness against the defendant's confrontation right in
determining the constitutionality of one-way video testimony).
212 See Aleinikoff, supra note 43, at 993; see also Ann Woolhandler, Essay, Rethinking the
Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 111, 121 (1988).
213 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
214 Id. at 600.
215 Id. at 604-05.
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In reading the result off the scales, however, Burger provided little
explanation of the metric by which the scale measured these conflicting interests. Burger did not specify the weightiness of these interests
when compared in the abstract, nor did he seriously examine the factual components of these interests when compared in the individual
case. We do not know, for example, how much value the Constitution attaches to a child's liberty interest, or the severity of the consequences following an incorrect commitment, or the state benefit
accruing from unfettered admissions to mental hospitals. Moreover,
we learn little from Burger's opinion regarding the effect of the deprivation of liberty on this child, the extent to which due process review
might increase the accuracy of commitments, or the state benefits
derived from increased commitments. 216 In short, the opinion lists
the values implicated by "voluntary" commitments of children seriatim, and summarily reviews the empirical consequences of these commitments, without ever truly reconciling these diverse and conflicting
factors.
b.

The Fourth Amendment

This Section began with the categorical method so it is fitting that it
concludes with the ad hoc balancing of the Fourth Amendment. It is
fitting because until relatively recently, the Fourth Amendment was
defined categorically. The modern Court, however, has moved the
Fourth Amendment in a short period of time from the categorical
pole to the ad hoc pole.2 17 The Fourth Amendment encapsulates in a
nutshell the Court's struggle to reconcile individual rights and government interests across the spectrum of constitutional methods.
In defining the reach of the Fourth Amendment,2 "' the Court at
first fashioned a categorical framework in which to assess challenged
216 See generally Lois A. Weithorn, Note, Mental Hospitalization of Troublesome Youth:
An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 773 (1988) (discussing the
reasons for the sharp increase in admissions of children to mental health facilities and
proposed solutions to this "problem").
217 This Section's description of the evolution of Fourth Amendment doctrine owes a
significant debt to my colleague Scott Sundby's excellent work. Scott E. Sundby, A Return to

Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 383
(1988). For another especially insightful analysis of the Fourth Amendment see Nadine
Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the

Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1173 (1988).
218 The Fourth Amendment provides as follows:
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state action. This categorical view focused on the warrant clause of
the amendment: "[T]he Court presumed that a warrant based on
probable cause was required before the police could perform a search
or arrest. ' 21 9 The reasonableness clause was avoided for fear that its
use would result in an ad hoc assessment that would take "Fourth
Amendment protection . . . [to] the evaporation point. '220 In its
struggle to maintain the categorical perspective, however, the Court
confused Madisonian tenets.
In Frank v. Maryland,2 2 1 for example, the Court considered
whether a warrantless inspection of a house violated the Fourth
Amendment. The Court sought to maintain the essential integrity of
the Fourth Amendment by not dispensing with the "rigorous constitutional restrictions" for the issuance of search warrants.2 22 Yet at
the same time, failure to allow warrantless housing inspections might
seriously undermine community health. The Court resolved this conflict "categorically," defining the reach of the amendment as
extending only to searches in connection with criminal prosecutions.
But Justice Felix Frankfurter's explanation of this definitional limitation reads like classic government interests analysis:
Time and experience have forcefully taught that the power to inspect
dwelling places, either as a matter of systematic area-by-area search
or, as here, to treat a specific problem, is of indispensable importance
to the maintenance of community health; a power that would be
greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the safeguards necessary for a search of evidence of criminal acts.223
The Frank Court's conclusion that the Fourth Amendment was not
infringed by housing inspections was reconsidered and rejected in
Camara v. Municipal Court.2 2 4 Justice White dismissed the "rather
remarkable premise" that housing inspections did not fall within the
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend IV.
219 Sundby, supra note 216, at 386.
220 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969).
221 359 U.S. 360 (1959), overruled by Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
222 Id. at 373.
223 Id. at 372.
224 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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definitional scope of the Fourth Amendment. 225 The essential purpose of the amendment, he observed, was to "safeguard the privacy
and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government
officials.1 2 6 Still, White recognized the government's need to conduct housing inspections without having to meet the onerous burden
of demonstrating individualized suspicion. White responded to the
pressing government interests by finding that the probable cause
requirement could be met if the government demonstrated the reasonableness of its area housing inspection.
In an illuminating debate, the Camara dissenters objected to the
majority's argument because it created an "unnecessary" procedural
hurdle to area housing inspections. Justice Tom C. Clark noted "that
the factors the Court relies upon are the identical ones [given] for
excusing warrants in Frank v. Maryland."227 Clark's observation is
telling. He complained that White's examination of the government
purposes at the application stage imposed the burden of requiring the
government to hurdle the "legalistic facade" of obtaining a search
warrant. 2 8 Clark overlooked the point that this "legalistic facade" of
demonstrating the reasonableness of the area inspection actually
maintained the integrity of the separate prongs of constitutional adjudication. Whereas in Frank the Court used government purposes to
define the limits of the Fourth Amendment, in Camara the Court
examined these purposes to determine whether the infringements
were justified. In this context, the different perspectives had a palpable effect: the burden of persuasion was placed upon the government
to demonstrate the reasonableness of its action. Over time, however,
the Court has increasingly ignored the essential insight of Camara
and has collapsed the definition and application prongs into one jumble. Today, these prongs are not collapsed as in Frank to demark a
category, but instead in an attempt to reconcile conflicting rights and
interests on a case-by-case basis.
It should be emphasized that the ad hoc formula of Camarahas the
potential to conform well to a balancing method based squarely on
Madisonian premises. The error in the Court's Fourth Amendment
balancing cases is not in the method, but rather in how it applies that

226

Id. at 531.
Id. at 528.

227
228

Id. at 554 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Id. at 554-55 (Clark, J., dissenting).

225
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balancing method. The Court's ad hoe balancing correctly operates
at the application stage but does not allocate the burden to the government as is usually done in that second prong. The Court collects
the arguments favoring rights and compares them to the government's reasons for infringing those rights: "On one side of the balance
are arrayed the individual's legitimate expectations of privacy and
personal security; on the other, the government's need for effective
methods to deal with breaches of public order. ' 229 But in practice,
rather than being solicitous of individual rights by placing a thumb on
the individual's side of the scales, "the judicial thumb... [has been]
planted firmly on the law enforcement side of the scales. ' 230 Across a
wide range of Fourth Amendment cases, the Court defers to government interests and judgments despite the infringement of the individual's right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. 231 This
majoritarian perspective has led the Court to accept some remarkable
empirical conclusions regarding the effect of police intrusions on an
individual's daily life. For example, in United States v. MartinezFuerte,232 in which the Court upheld border patrol checkpoint stops
of vehicles away from the border without particularized suspicion, the
Court observed that "the stops [at border crossing checkpoints]
should not be frightening or offensive because of their public and relatively routine nature. '233 This questionable assumption was accepted
because the Court did not scrutinize it with any rigor.
Another good example of the Court's approach is New Jersey v.
TL. O.234 In T.L.O., the Court upheld a school administrator's
search of a student's handbag that was conducted without a warrant
and without probable cause. The student had been accused of smoking in the bathroom; the search uncovered cigarettes, rolling papers,
marijuana, and written notes linking the student to selling drugs. Justice White, writing for the Court, balanced the student's right to privacy against the interests of the school. 235 Although the Court found
the student's right to privacy in her personal possessions to be signifi229 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
230 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 720 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
231 See Strossen, supra note 216, at 1190-91.
232 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
233 Id. at 560.
234 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
235 Id. at 337.
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cant,2 36 the Court concluded that "the substantial interest of teachers
and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on
school grounds" 237 was greater.
A close reading of T.L.O. reveals that the balance was considered
to be a close call, with the school's interest only slightly edging out
the student's rights.238 It might well seem that if the burden of persuasion had been on the government, it would have lost. Justice
Blackmun, who would disagree with this observation, criticized the
majority for not making it clear that the government generally does
bear a substantial burden at the application stage and that it had met
that burden in this case.239 Justice Blackmun explained that the
Fourth Amendment finds a search to be "reasonable only if supported
by a judicial warrant based on probable cause. ' ' 24 This standard, he
argued, is waived "[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." 241 Blackmun's concurrence follows the spirit of Camara in advancing an ad
hoc balancing strategy at the application stage and, at the same time,
adhering to basic Madisonian principles by placing the burden
squarely on the government to prove a "special need."
The Court's error in Fourth Amendment ad hoc balancing lies in
its failure to adequately scrutinize the government's interests when a
fundamental right is at stake. As the Court understood, the search in
T.L. 0. was not an unobtrusive event that did not substantially implicate privacy concerns. 242 The principal searched through the student's handbag and read her private correspondence. Yet in the
balance, the Court merely heaped upon the scales the conflicting
interests, failing to assess with any rigor the quality of the factors it
was weighing.

236 Id. at 337-39.
237 Id. at 339.
238 Id. at 339-43.

239 Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J.,concurring).
240 Id. (Blackmun, J.,concurring) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 722
(1983)).
concurring).
241 Id. (Blackmun, J.,
242 Id. at 337-39.
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CONCLUSION

Conventionally understood, constitutional adjudication consists of
two parts: a definition prong and an application prong. At the definition stage, the Court determines whether a constitutional right applies

and, if so, how deeply the right is held. At the application stage, the
Court determines whether the Constitution has been violated by
assessing the government's justification for infringing the covered
right. Under traditional Madisonian principles, these prongs are
entirely separate, and indeed, if the Bill of Rights is to constitute an
effective bulwark, rights cannot be defined by the majority's reasons
for acting. Contrary to this model, the Court regularly imports government interest analysis into the definition prong, thus identifying
the existence and parameters of individual rights by virtue of government purposes. This practice violates the most basic operating
assumptions of the Constitution.
Under the conventional view, government action is presumptively
valid. This initial presumption gives rise to a series of shifting burdens of persuasion in constitutional adjudication. The challenger of
government action first must demonstrate that a right encompassed
by the Constitution has been infringed. If a deeply revered right is
implicated, the government assumes the burden to justify the infringement with sufficient reasons. The strength of this argument invariably
depends on the factual relationship between the government action
and its stated purposes. In theory, therefore, the definition prong
establishes who holds the burden of persuasion in the application
stage, as well as how heavy that burden will be.
In practice, however, the Court regularly employs government
interests analysis in its rights definition. This practice has a profound
effect on constitutional discourse. By evaluating government purposes in the definition prong the Court effectively reverses the burden
of persuasion for demonstrating the factual nexus between those purposes and the complained of action. The Court removes the burden
from the government by using the government's purposes to define
the right at stake, thus shifting the burden to the challenger who is
responsible for showing that the Constitution applies in the first place.
The Court has merged the two prongs of constitutional adjudication all along the spectrum of constitutional methods. At the categorical pole, the Court uses government interest analysis to define a
category's contours. The government's purposes are submerged in
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the Court's definition of the pertinent category, a definition for which
the challenger ultimately bears the burden. In the array of balancing
strategies the Court has also transposed Madisonian principles. In
definitional balancing the Court uses government interests to lighten
the individual's side of the scales. This practice has the effect of shifting away from the government any obligation to demonstrate the factual justification for its infringement of an individual right. The right
is defined as not existing by virtue of the asserted government purposes. Similarly, in multitiered balancing contexts the Court employs
government interests to dilute the definition of rights, rather than
scrutinize those interests to determine whether they justify the
infringement of defined rights. Finally, in ad hoc balancing, the
Court does not so much misallocate the burden of persuasion as simply fail to allocate it at all. Ad hoc balancing proceeds on the assumption that a constitutional right is implicated but often succeeds in
deferring to the government's stated needs.
The Court's failure to keep the two stages of constitutional adjudication separate is indicative of a deep crisis confronting constitutional
theory. The Court's responsibility for mediating the inherent conflict
between individual rights and majority will means it should not
greatly privilege one fundamental principle over the other. Although
the Court describes its methodology as either neutral or with limited
majoritarian leanings, its methodology belies this description. The
merger of the two prongs of constitutional adjudication achieves a
significant victory for majoritarian forces. Majoritarianism has prevailed not through a frontal assault, however, but by stealthily moving inside the walls of the Bill of Rights to weaken individual liberties
from within.
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